The Impact of Socioeconomic Status on 30-day Hospital Readmissions in South Carolina by Ewing, Joseph Alexander
Clemson University
TigerPrints
All Dissertations Dissertations
5-2017
The Impact of Socioeconomic Status on 30-day
Hospital Readmissions in South Carolina
Joseph Alexander Ewing
Clemson University, josephaewing@gmail.com
Follow this and additional works at: https://tigerprints.clemson.edu/all_dissertations
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Dissertations at TigerPrints. It has been accepted for inclusion in All Dissertations by
an authorized administrator of TigerPrints. For more information, please contact kokeefe@clemson.edu.
Recommended Citation
Ewing, Joseph Alexander, "The Impact of Socioeconomic Status on 30-day Hospital Readmissions in South Carolina" (2017). All
Dissertations. 1895.
https://tigerprints.clemson.edu/all_dissertations/1895
THE IMPACT OF SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS ON 30-DAY HOSPITAL 
READMISSIONS IN SOUTH CAROLINA
A Dissertation 
Presented to 
the Graduate School of 
Clemson University 
In Partial Fulfillment 
of the Requirements for the Degree 
Doctor of Philosophy 
Applied Economics 
by 
Joseph Alexander Ewing 
May 2017 
Accepted by: 
Dr. David Willis, Committee Co-chair
Dr. David Hughes, Committee Co-chair
Dr. Patrick Gerard
Dr. Daniel Miller
Dr. William Bridges 
ii 
ABSTRACT 
The current method for calculating excess hospital readmission penalties does not 
incorporate measures of socioeconomic status, thereby leaving nonprofit teaching and 
safety net hospitals vulnerable to financial reimbursement penalties due to exogenously 
determined heterogeneous patient populations. The literature has shown that 
socioeconomically disadvantaged groups are readmitted to nonprofit teaching hospital's 
in higher proportions than more advantaged groups.  Increased readmission to nonprofit 
teaching hospitals has been linked with cost shifting from those unable to pay to those 
with the ability to pay for medical care. Therefore, a new method for determining hospital 
excess readmission penalties is needed to reduce the incentive of cost shifting and 
penalize underperforming hospitals in a more justifiable way.  
The two objectives of this research are to demonstrate the differences among 
hospital readmission rates by hospital type, and to demonstrate how the current Hospital 
Readmission Reduction program penalizes nonprofit teaching hospitals for excess 
readmissions as a result of their exogenous patient mix.  A proposed method of adjusting 
excess readmission penalty determination uses patient insurance status to proxy for 
socioeconomic status. Hospitals are then grouped into quintiles of similar distributions 
based on patient mix.  The proposed method of calculating excess readmission penalties 
is applied to a database of hospital claims for acute myocardial infarction (AMI) patients 
in the state of South Carolina.  Results of the proposed method are then compared to 
results from the existing Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) method of 
calculating excess readmission penalties.  The collected empirical data is subsequently 
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used to construct bootstrapped samples to re-estimate excess readmission penalty. The 
bootstrapped analysis showed the difference in same hospital readmission penalties 
between the two methods resulted in a 1.12% revenue reduction for nonprofit teaching 
hospitals and 0.22% reduction for non-teaching hospitals.  As a result, controlling for 
hospital patient characteristics caused by exogenous patient mix is likely to reduce the 
degree of hospital cost shifting to private payers. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Healthcare policy reform is a complex and multifaceted problem that has plagued 
the United States for decades.  The most recent healthcare policy reform is The Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (PPACA), which was signed into law on 
March 23, 2010.  Originally passed to provide healthcare coverage to most Americans, 
the law is comprised of several smaller pieces of legislation to reform healthcare policy 
(Cannon, 2013).  The intent of the law is to simultaneously improve health care quality 
and lower the cost of doing so nationwide. One important facet of this legislation is The 
Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program (HRRP). Hospital Readmissions within 30 
days of a previous hospital admission have been shown to be a costly and undesired 
healthcare outcome (Nagasako et al. 2014, Jenks et. al 2009).  Higher patient cost result 
from unplanned readmissions caused by misaligned incentives whereby a hospital 
receives compensation through Medicare reimbursements for the quality of care initially 
provided by a hospital. Prior to HRRP hospitals were effectively incentivized by the 
volume of patients rather than the quality of care provided.  HRRP aims to improve the 
quality of care and lower costs by requiring hospitals to minimize the probability of 
readmission.  
Established by section 3025 of the PPACA to improve the quality of care to the 
Medicare population, HRRP assesses penalties in the form of reduced reimbursement 
payments to hospitals with ‘excessive’ readmissions. The HRRP was implemented on 
October 1, 2012 by calculating excess readmissions ratios over a 3-year period for three 
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diagnostic conditions, acute myocardial infarction (AMI), heart failure, and pneumonia.  
The law was further expanded to include exacerbations of chronic obstructive pulmonary 
disease, total knee and total hip arthroplasty in 2015.  To determine excess readmissions, 
the program compares each individual hospital readmission rate to the national 
readmission rate calculated by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS). 
Through a proprietary algorithm, CMS includes hospital and patient level variables to set 
an acceptable baseline readmission rate for each condition to which all hospitals are 
compared. Any hospital deemed to have a readmission rate in excess of the accepted 
readmission rate is penalized based on the ratio of excess readmissions to the accepted 
readmission rate. These excess readmission ratios provide the foundation for determining 
penalties in the form of a payment adjustment factor applied to Medicare reimbursement. 
In the first year of this program, nearly two thirds of US hospitals received 
penalties for having readmissions rates above the CMS threshold rate. This resulted in 
2,225 hospitals receiving total penalties of roughly $280 million in the form of reduced 
Medicare reimbursements (Williams 2013).  In percentage terms, the penalties were 
capped at a maximum of a 2% reduction in a hospital's Medicare reimbursement in 2014 
and a 3% reduction in 2015. Since 2012, there have been improvements in condition-
adjusted readmissions rates and associated reimbursement penalties, with a decrease in 
the average penalty of 0.42% to 0.38% reduction in Medicare reimbursement (Rau 2013, 
MEDPAC 2013). Despite the marginal improvements as a result of HRRP, the legislation 
has a significant drawback by treating all hospitals as one homogenous group.  
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Many of the 2,225 hospitals are penalized for exogenous reasons outside their 
control as reported in the readmissions literature (Joynt, Jha 2013, Philbin et al., 2001). 
The primary driver of excess readmissions among larger teaching and safety net hospitals 
is the greater percentage of poor patients readmitted than patients of higher 
socioeconomic class (Kamerow, 2013, Lewin et al. 2000). Socioeconomic status is 
currently not taken into account when calculating excess readmissions rates, and many 
argue it should be included (Mueller et al. 2013, and Shahian et al. 2012, Philbin et al 
2001, Shimizu et al. 2014). As these authors note, lower socioeconomic status increases 
the likelihood of readmission due to patients having less access to care, non-compliance 
to physician orders, and lower nutritional status, among many other reasons.  
Teaching hospital's provide post graduate medical education to physicians, nurses 
and other medical professionals.  Teaching hospitals are typically affiliated with a 
medical school or a university, and are closely tied to state and federal government 
through subsidies for medical student and medical resident education.  In contrast, safety 
net hospitals provide care to large proportions of low-income, uninsured, or vulnerable 
patients. Many of these patients are unwilling or unable to pay for hospital services. 
Hospitals providing uncompensated care receive federal funding to cover these costs in 
much greater proportion to total revenue than non-safety net hospitals. Moreover, some 
teaching hospitals may also serve as safety net hospitals.   
The key is to understand the relation between hospital type, patient 
socioeconomic status and hospital readmission rate.  Outside of true emergency cases, 
some hospitals can refuse care to patients due to inability to pay. Safety net hospitals 
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cannot refuse patients, and thereby often receive poor patients in higher proportions 
(Lewin et al. 2000).  Another common characteristic is safety net hospitals are nonprofit 
institutions, and many teaching hospitals are also nonprofit. As to be discussed, nonprofit 
and for-profit hospitals have different objectives in terms of profit motive and importance 
of "prestige." 
The Yale New Haven Health Services Corporation (YNHHSC), which provides 
analytical support to CMS and helped develop the current standards for the HRRP, 
explains the current rational for not including socioeconomic status when calculating 
excess readmissions: 
"The measures also do not adjust for socioeconomic status because the 
association between socioeconomic status and health outcomes can be 
due, in part, to differences in the quality of healthcare groups of patients 
with varying socioeconomic status receive.  Risk adjusting for 
socioeconomic status could also mask important disparities and 
minimize incentives to improve outcomes for vulnerable populations 
(page 12)." 
Nagasako et al. outline the argument well stating that the current policy, which 
excludes socioeconomic status, is maintianed ..."in order to maintain the visibility of 
differences in health outcomes for groups with different socioeconomic status 
characteristics (2014, page 787)."  However, Nagasako et al. also note that there is a 
strong need to control for socioeconomic status factors "...to avoid disproportionately 
penalizing hospitals that care for a large number of patients from disadvantaged 
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backgrounds and communities (2014, page 787)." Furthermore, Shimizu et al. find that 
the current standard of assessing hospital readmissions as an indicator of medical care 
quality is inadequate because it is applied irrespective of the patient populations served at 
hospitals throughout the country (Shimizu et al., 2014). 
Joynt and Jha were among the first to expand the literature by reporting 
differences in Medicare reimbursement penalties stratified by hospital characteristics. 
They found that larger hospitals (>400 beds) received greater penalties than their smaller 
counterparts (<200 beds).  Joynt and Jha showed that 40% of large hospitals were highly 
penalized compared to 28% of small hospitals.  Highly penalized is considered a 
Medicare reimbursement reduction penalty above 0.72%, and a low penalty is less than a 
0.15% reimbursement reduction. Additionally, major teaching hospitals are more likely 
to be highly penalized (44%) than non-teaching hospitals (33%) based on adjusted odds 
ratios from a multinomial logistic regression (P<0.001) (Joynt, Jha 2013).  The evidence 
suggests that these differences are due in large part to socioeconomic factors as well as 
the greater proportion of medically complex cases larger teaching hospitals encounter, as 
compared to smaller non-teaching hospitals. Joynt and Jha clearly show that the level of 
Medicare reimbursement penalties are correlated with socioeconomic status. The authors 
provide adjusted odds ratios demonstrating that major teaching hospitals, which serve a 
more socioeconomically disadvantaged population, are more likely to be highly penalized 
(above average penalties) than non-teaching hospitals (44% versus 33%) and less likely 
to not be penalized than non-teaching hospitals (19% versus 35%, respectively).  
Additionally, Joynt and Jha found that safety-net hospitals are also more likely to be 
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highly penalized than non-safety-net hospitals (44% versus 30%)   This result supports 
the hypothesis that lower socioeconomic status is often associated with increased medical 
complexity, and highly complex medical cases are admitted to teaching and safety net 
hospitals in a higher proportion relative to other hospital types (Philbin et al., 2001).  
Thus, teaching and safety net hospitals are likely to have a higher readmission rate. 
 Differences in patient populations among teaching versus non-teaching hospitals 
has been understood for decades but are now especially problematic and relevant due to 
the penalties associated with HRRP and PPACA.  In 2001, Philbin et al. analyzed 
socioeconomic status as a risk factor for hospital readmission, following previous 
admission for heart failure.  They found that after adjusting for other confounding factors, 
lower income is a positive predictor of readmission risk based on a statistically 
significant difference in the proportion of readmissions between the highest and lowest 
income quartiles using a Mantel-Haenszel chi-squared test (P<0.0001) (Philbin et al., 
2001). More recently, studies assessing hospital care quality have shown that major 
teaching hospitals have lower mortality rates but higher readmission rates (Shahian 2012, 
Meuller 2013).  
 The emphasis on the quality of care provided by hospitals is a direct result of the 
PPACA, and is beginning to positively impact the U.S. health care industry by insuring 
more people.  However, adjustments may be needed to ensure the longevity and 
continued improvement of the PPACA.  Based on the cited literature, some of these 
program adjustments focus on the use of the HRRP to determine hospital quality in the 
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changing healthcare industry. One of the primary policy changes being considered is 
incorporation of socioeconomic status into the excess readmission calculation.  
In a report to Congress in June of 2013, the Medicare Payment Advisory 
Commission (MEDPAC) proposed several changes to the structure of HRRP (2013). One 
proposed change is to group hospitals based on the proportion of poor patients they serve 
and then calculate benchmark readmission rates of the "within" group average to which 
they will be compared.  This proposed change is not a direct risk adjustment for 
socioeconomic status yet it functions in a similar way. 
Many of the changes proposed by MEDPAC focus on the imbalance of incidence 
and magnitude of penalties for major teaching hospitals. MEDPAC documents that major 
teaching hospitals have received the highest average penalty, a 0.45% reduction in 2014 
Medicare reimbursements, and also have the highest share of hospitals receiving the 
maximum 2% penalty relative to other hospital classifications.  These differences might 
be explained by the federal obligation that teaching hospitals treat and care for the more 
disadvantaged patient groups. Until recently, such teaching hospitals received 
reimbursements through disproportionate share hospital (DSH) payments to compensate 
for the uninsured care they provide.  The commission noted that major teaching hospitals 
receiving the highest penalties are also the hospitals receiving higher DSH payments. 
DSH payments are designed to compensate hospitals for the care and treatment of 
uninsured patients. However, at the time of MEDPAC's report, there was a legal and 
political debate nationwide which would confound the availability of future DHS 
payments to large teaching hospitals.  
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When the PPACA was signed into law on March 23, 2010, the constitutionality of 
various aspects of the PPACA was challenged by the Supreme Court of the United States 
in National Federation of Independent Business versus Sebelius, 2012. In their ruling on 
June 28, 2012, the Court declared that most of the components of the PPACA were 
constitutional except for the federal requirement that all states expand Medicaid 
eligibility to 138% of the federal poverty level.  The court ruled that legislative change is 
a decision left up to the states.  (The same legal situation as prior to the PPACA, where 
the eligibility requirement was left to each state, thereby resulting in highly variable 
Medicaid eligibility requirements nationwide.)  The objective of nationally standardized 
Medicaid eligibility among all states is just one component of the PPACA meant to work 
in conjunction with the federal reduction in DSH payments.  Under the original concept, 
no problem was anticipated  because all states would have expanded Medicaid eligibility 
under the same rule, thereby providing access to health insurance for the poorest segment 
of the population.  However, the Supreme Court ruling created the possibility of a large 
gap in health insurance coverage for the most economically disadvantaged people in 
states voting to not expand Medicaid eligibility.  Theoretically, if states expanded 
Medicaid eligibility in conjunction with all other requirements of the PPACA, there 
would be few gaps in insurance coverage thereby rendering DSH payments almost 
unnecessary.  However, in states that forgo the "option" to expand Medicaid eligibility, a 
gap of uninsured socioeconomically disadvantaged people will remain.  Further 
compounding the coverage issue is the fact that when this population receives care from 
hospitals legally required to treat them, the hospital will no longer be reimbursed for their 
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care.  Consequently, when this same population is readmitted, the hospital will have to 
pay for their treatment and might be subject to losing a portion of their Medicare 
reimbursement for the excessive readmission. 
In 2013, Nikki Haley, the governor of South Carolina (SC), vowed not to expand 
Medicaid Eligibility to South Carolinians. Her decision has resulted in an insurance 
coverage gap for some of the poorest people in SC, which has placed the burden of 
uncompensated care directly on larger teaching hospitals, which serve as safety net 
hospitals.  The uninsured South Carolina population, which as Philbin et al. (2001) 
demonstrated, is more likely to be readmitted to the hospital, places the financial burden 
directly on teaching hospitals in two ways.  First, the hospital must provide care to 
patients for which they are not completely reimbursed due to reduced DSH payments.  
Second, these patients contribute to a health center's marginal "excess" readmission rate, 
resulting in a Medicare reimbursement penalty and additional cost. The full ramifications 
of this outcome are not known. However, economic theory suggests hospitals might 
attempt to  recover the deficit by shifting the cost of care from the uninsured to private 
payers.  Another way to smooth the cost differential in SC teaching hospitals would be 
for the federal government reimbursement guidelines to include socioeconomic status as 
a factor in the risk-adjustment calculation. 
Currently CMS does not include a measure of socioeconomic status in the 
calculation of excess readmissions and associated penalties.  However, a growing body of 
literature clearly identifies socioeconomic status as a determining factor in hospital 
readmission (Philbin et.al, 2001, Shahian 2012, Meuller 2013).  This literature clearly 
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documents that low income patients have increasingly gone to nonprofit teaching and 
safety net hospitals for medical care (Lewin et al. 2000).  These two issues in 
combination with the HRRP treating all hospitals as a homogenous group has resulted in 
an inappropriate standardized measure for calculating hospital Medicare reimbursement 
penalties and the degree of penalties they receive.  
While it is important to document the differences between for-profit hospitals and 
nonprofit teaching hospitals, it is also important to consider the distribution and evolution 
of the two hospital types within the medical care market.  Inherent to this market is the 
obligation to provide care to socioeconomically disadvantaged patients without an ability 
to pay, a role often assumed by nonprofit teaching hospitals.  The act of providing 
uncompensated care can decrease revenues. It has been theorized that nonprofit hospitals 
may offset their revenue losses through gains in prestige associated with the provision of 
uncompensated care (Hirth 1997; Rosenman et al. 2000).  An extension of Gary Becker's 
"A Theory of Social Interaction" is presented in Chapter III to demonstrate how the role 
of nonprofit hospitals is similar to the role of a "charitable" family member motivated by 
social acclaim through charitable actions (Becker, 1974).  The notion of prestige 
optimization among nonprofit teaching hospitals is of primary importance in any 
discussion of medical care markets.    
The objectives of this research are twofold. First, to illustrate the differences 
among hospital readmission rates by hospital type; second, to demonstrate how the 
current Hospital Readmission Reduction program penalizes nonprofit teaching hospitals 
for excess readmissions as a result of their patient mix. It is hypothesized that by 
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developing a measure of excess hospital readmission that considers patient mix (patient 
characteristics), hospitals that serve a greater proportion of poor patients, who are often 
much sicker at admittance, will have a significant decrease in reimbursement penalty 
relative to the penalties they are now subject to as estimated under existing protocol.  
A longitudinal data set of SC hospital visits is used to analyze the current method 
for calculating readmissions for Acute Myocardial Infarction (AMI). The difference in 
readmission rates between teaching and non-teaching hospitals is analyzed directly using 
chi-squared tests, and logistic regression analysis. Additionally a Cox Proportional 
Hazards model was used to test differences in hazard ratios between teaching and non-
teaching hospitals. Readmission rates under the current and proposed MEDPAC methods 
are analyzed to assess differences in excess readmission penalties between the two 
methodologies.  With the first method being the current HRRP method for assessing 
hospital readmissions, and the second method proposed by MEDPAC, that assesses 
excess readmissions by stratifying hospitals by the proportion of low income patients 
they serve. The magnitude of the estimated readmission penalty is a primary component 
of lost hospital revenue and can result in cost shifting.  With reduced Medicare 
reimbursement as a result of excessive readmissions penalties stemming from patient 
mix, the revenue burden may be shifted to commercial insurance payers through higher 
hospital charges, which ultimately results in higher insurance premiums. Estimated 
readmissions penalties are compared under the current and proposed method to proxy for 
the potential degree of cost shifting as a result of differences in patient mix.  Results from 
this comparison are used to determine which penalty structure is least influenced by 
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socioeconomically disadvantaged  patient populations. Previous research (White 2013, 
Morrisey 1993, 1994, 1996, Frakt 2010) has found that while cost shifting might exist as 
a result of reduced public payment, the degree of cost shifting is likely minor and 
primarily a result of market structure and hospital competition. Prior research also 
provides evidence against cost shifting and labels the increased cost phenomena as price 
discrimination.  Regardless of the name placed on hospital behavior in response to 
reduced public payment, the fact remains that hospitals will attempt to recoup the reduced 
revenue from discrepancies in readmissions penalties stemming from diverse patient 
populations.  These issues are discussed further in Chapter VI.  
A review of the literature is presented in Chapter II.  A theoretical model of cost 
shifting as a foundation for understanding the impact of socioeconomic status on 
readmissions penalties is presented in Chapter III. SC hospital data are presented in 
Chapter IV along with empirical discussion of the models being tested.  Results are 
presented in Chapter V. Policy conclusions and research extensions are provided in 
Chapter VI.   
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CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
The problem of hospital readmission has plagued hospitals long before the 
inception of Medicare’s fee-for-service program. As discussed in Chapter I, care 
providers were previously incentivized by the volume of patients cared for rather than the 
quality of care provided to those patients. With the introduction of the Hospital 
Readmission Reduction Program (HRRP), the focus shifted away from herding patients 
in and out as quickly as possible towards a more quality centric focus. Historically, 
hospitals have been paid by Medicare for each patient based on diagnoses and procedures 
each time a patient is discharged from the hospital.  Thus, if a patient returns to the 
hospital it begins the process anew, representing misaligned incentive structures as 
hospitals receive additional compensation for each readmittance. This protocol has 
exacerbated quality and cost concerns.  The removal of this misaligned incentive through 
HRRP now requires hospitals to focus on the initial quality of care they provide to reduce 
the likelihood of an unplanned readmission.  HRRP is proving to be an effective program 
with overall readmission rates falling to an average of 17.8% in 2012, from an average of 
19.0% over the previous five years (Ness, 2013). However, there are many questions 
associated with the efficacy of the current readmission penalty structure. One main 
concern is the difference in case mix between non-teaching hospitals and larger teaching 
hospitals, which tend to serve the poorer and underinsured portion of the health care 
population (Kamerow, 2013).   
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Differences in hospitals often go further than just teaching or safety net status.  In 
South Carolina for example, only a few hospitals treat severe heart attacks. Smaller 
hospitals transfer heart patients to larger hospitals, which can better serve them through 
more technologically advanced, resource-intensive care. Transferring patients places 
more pressure on teaching hospitals (which serve as treatment centers for severe cases) 
because if patients are readmitted for any reason it is the terminal hospital visit, which is 
charged with the readmission, not the initial hospital that transferred the patient.  To gain 
an understanding of how diagnoses, timing, and other factors contribute to hospital 
readmissions, and how these factors vary among hospitals, it is necessary to review the 
literature.  
Previous studies (Jenks 2009, Naylor 2004, Dharmarajan 2013) estimated the 
relationship between patient characteristics, including severity of illness at admission, 
and the time to readmission using Kaplan Meier curves, and Cox Proportional Hazard 
models. Jenks, Williams, and Coleman, analyzed the Medicare Provider Analysis and 
Review (MEDPAR) data file for all US Medicare fee-for-service patients from October 
1, 2003 through September 30, 2004. The study population consisted of 11,855,702 
patients deemed at risk for readmission, after removing records for patient death and 
transfers (2009).  The cohort was analyzed for readmission at censored intervals of 30, 
60, 90, 180, and 365 days for the five most common medical conditions and surgical 
procedures.  The authors calculated the 30-day readmission rate, total readmission rate 
over the study period, as well as the readmission rate for the 10 most frequent readmitting 
conditions.  The 30-day readmission rates for heart failure and pneumonia were 26.9% 
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and 20.1% respectively.  The authors also calculated the national all condition 30-day 
readmission rate for the 2003 fiscal year to be 18.1%.  Jenks, Williams, and Coleman 
identified the specific predictors of 30-day readmission. These predictors are (1) multiple 
prior hospitalizations over the study period; (2) an index length of stay (LOS) at least 
twice as long as average for an admission in the same diagnosis related group (DRG); (3) 
the disabled; (4) those receiving Supplemental Security Income (SSI) (indicative of 
poverty status); and (5) individuals older than 70 years of age.   
While Jenks, Williams and Coleman focused on patient characteristics that 
contribute to readmission, much of the literature has focused on care transitions.  The 
transition of care from a hospital setting to home requires education of the patient as well 
as the care takers on medication reconciliation and coordination of follow-up care.  
Research on hospital readmission (MEDPAC, 2007) illustrates that early hospital 
readmissions, within 7 days, are related to the quality of care received in the hospital.  
Conversely, the bulk of readmissions occurring after 7 days are related to issues 
surrounding discharge education and patient follow up (Stone, 2010).  Readmission 
reduction programs focusing on care transition have been very successful and are now 
implemented in almost all hospitals nationwide as a result of HRRP (Ashton et al., 
Coleman et al., Hansen et al.).   
One of the more prominent, successful interventions to improve care transition 
was studied in a randomized controlled trial done by Naylor et al. (2004).  In this trial, the 
authors examined the effectiveness of using an advanced practice nurse (APN) trained 
specifically in heart failure to monitor patients with a heart failure admission, with the 
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aim of reducing unnecessary readmissions.  The authors recruited 239 patients admitted 
for heart failure and randomized them into either the intervention group, which received 
the care of an APN, or to a control group, which received routine care of the admitting 
hospital.  The intervention group received three months of post hospitalization APN 
coordination between primary physician, pharmacists, and patients.  The intervention 
group also had daily access to the APN as needed, including 24 hour follow up at the 
patient's home after leaving the hospital.  The APN also fostered collaboration among the 
patient's therapists to inform the primary physician of progress and discuss needed 
changes in the care regimen.  The effectiveness of APN coordination was analyzed by 
studying the differences in readmission rates between the control and intervention groups.  
The authors used Kaplan-Meier curves and Cox Proportional Hazard models to assess 
differences in timing and diagnosis of readmissions. 
Study results found that fewer intervention group patients were readmitted within 
one year, as compared to the control group (44.9%, 55.4% respectively). Furthermore, the 
authors found improvements in reported quality of life as well as higher patient 
satisfaction ratings with the care provided by the intervention groups as compared to the 
control groups (Naylor et al., 2004).  These improvements in readmission rates, quality of 
life, and patient satisfaction also resulted in an overall mean cost savings of intervention 
group of $4,845 per patient including the cost of training and compensating the APN's, as 
compared to traditional care in the control group.  Here, costs represent the total cost to 
treat a patient through the entire course of their illness.  The care coordination 
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intervention was shown to be effective, both financially and clinically, in a controlled 
setting.   
A more recent analysis of the diagnosis and timing of 30-day hospital 
readmissions was done by Dharmarajan et al (2013).  They used Medicare fee-for-service 
claims from 2007-2009 to analyze diagnoses and timing for heart attacks (acute 
myocardial infarction, or AMI), heart failure, and pneumonia readmissions. These 
readmissions were categorized in ranges to analyze differences in diagnoses and 
readmission rates for date ranges including 0-3, 0-7, 0-15, 0-30, 4-7, 8-15, and 16-30 
days.  The authors used Kaplan-Meier survival curves censored at 30-days to analyze 
differences in time to readmission for 10 diagnosis categories.  Cox proportional hazard 
models were estimated to determine the relation between patient characteristics and time 
to readmission by diagnosis group.  However, the authors were unable to show any 
difference in readmission rates attributable to patient demographics, or time to 
readmission for hospitalizations of heart failure, heart attack, or presence of pneumonia.   
If patients are readmitted at similar rates across age, sex, and race, what factors 
lead to differences in readmissions rates among hospitals?  Joynt and Jha (2013) answer 
this question by analyzing differences in readmission rates and penalties by hospital type. 
Using HRRP data, they found that major teaching hospitals are more likely to be both 
penalized and more highly penalized when compared to non-teaching hospitals. Joynt and 
Jha mention that these "differences between hospitals are likely related to both case mix 
(medical complexity) and socioeconomic mix of the patient populations (page 343, 
2013)." Incorporated into the readmissions estimates reported by Joynt and Jha are HRRP 
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methods of risk adjusting to control for indicators of patient frailty (YNHHSC 2014). 
Therefore, if medical comorbidities (multiple chronic diseases affecting patient's health, 
ex. diabetes, hypertension, smoking)  are controlled through risk adjustments, the 
resulting differences in readmissions pointed out by Joynt and Jha are due to differences 
in the socioeconomic populations at teaching versus non-teaching hospitals.  
Mueller et al. (2013), and Shahian et al. (2012) test the hypothesis that teaching 
and non-teaching hospitals differ in quality and performance. Both studies concluded that 
teaching hospitals have lower mortality rates and higher readmissions rates than non-
teaching hospitals. The higher readmission rate was surprising since teaching hospitals 
have more advanced clinical techniques. They explain this outcome by noting the high 
proportion of disadvantaged populations served by teaching hospitals are likely sicker 
when initially admitted.  
Few papers have directly addressed the possible links between socioeconomic 
status and likelihood of readmission.  Philbin et al. (2001) analyzed the socioeconomic 
status as a risk factor for readmission in heart failure patients in New York state hospitals. 
They found that patients from the lowest household income quartile had a significantly (p 
<0.0001) higher percentage of readmission (23%) as compared to patients from the 
highest income quartile (20%).  Furthermore, the authors point out that 65% of 
hospitalizations for lower income patients are in teaching hospitals, compared to 44% 
among higher income groups.  Supporting this conclusion, Lindenauer et al. (2013) found 
a 1.5% increase in the risk of hospital readmission for every 5% increase in Gini 
coefficient.  Stated another way, if the difference in mean income between the highest 
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and lowest income quartile across patients increases by 5%, hospital readmissions would 
increase by 1.5%. Thus, as the disparity in patient incomes at a hospital grows, so does 
the readmission rate.    
Shimizu et al. analyzed the factors related to readmission at a single teaching 
hospital (2014).  The authors tracked all readmissions to their institution, Harbor-UCLA 
Medical Center from January through September of 2012.  Harbor-UCLA Medical 
Center provides care to predominantly poor, uneducated, and very ill patients. They argue 
that their patient population is primarily responsible for their above US hospital average 
readmission rate.  They conclude that that higher readmission rates at teaching hospitals 
are not related to the quality of care provided, but rather the characteristics of the patient 
population. 
Thus, teaching hospitals are being penalized more for patient characteristics than 
quality of health care provided.  Additional studies by Shimizu et al., Lindenauer et al., 
and Philbin et al. also support the hypothesis that readmissions rates at teaching hospitals 
are not a reflection of inadequate medical care, but rather the result of caring for a 
socioeconomically disadvantaged set of patients who often lack health insurance and tend 
to be sicker when admitted to the hospital. Aims to mitigate this specific issue are 
currently being debated and analyzed.  In June of 2013 the Medicare Payment Advisory 
Committee (MEDPAC) issued a report to the US Congress with guidelines for refining 
the HRRP.  One proposed refinement to HRRP is to explicitly recognize hospital 
readmission rates are positively correlated with their share of low-income patients 
(MEDPAC 2013).  
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The MEDPAC report notes the high readmission rate among teaching hospitals is 
directly tied to admitting low income patients who are more likely to be sicker upon 
admission.  They further note that although The Centers for Medicaid and Medicare 
Services (CMS) risk adjust based on medical conditions such as increased age and other 
chronic conditions such as diabetes, they do not directly risk adjust based on 
socioeconomic status. Lower socioeconomic status is associated with increased incidence 
of these chronic conditions; however, it is not explicitly incorporated into CMS's 
algorithm assessing excess readmissions.  
To examine the impact of socioeconomic status on readmission rates, hospitals 
were stratified into deciles by the proportion of Medicare patients who also qualified for 
Supplemental Security Income (SSI) (MEDPAC).  SSI is a federal program for seniors 
and disabled individuals with incomes of less than $1,000 a month (MEDPAC).  Analysis 
of readmission rates and penalties under the current HRRP scheme resulted in a strong 
monotonic relationship between the proportion of patients on SSI and readmission 
penalties (MEDPAC). While it may be difficult to dramatically reduce readmissions rates 
for hospitals treating the uninsured and poor, it may be possible to bring the rates closer 
to a national average using more comprehensive readmission measures.  Hospitals that 
serve a large proportion of poor patients should see a downward shift in their excess 
readmission rate as a result of incorporating a proxy for socioeconomic status into the 
excess readmission calculation.  The effect of this proposed policy change should more 
fairly treat hospitals that cater to the more socioeconomically disadvantaged. 
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This policy change provides a means to reduce penalties to teaching hospitals 
required to care for poorer, sicker patients.  Evaluating hospitals in relation to their peers 
by share of care provided to low-income patients will provide an improved reference of 
comparison over the current comparison to the national average. For example, each 
hospital in a decile could be compared to the decile average, or group average, 
readmission rate to determine excess readmissions.  Hospitals will still report their 
individual readmission rates, but when calculating penalties, hospitals will be compared 
to the performance of hospitals with similar economic patient profiles. This approach 
does not directly adjust for socioeconomic status.  However, the group comparisons 
smooth the differences in patient mix among hospitals by controlling for income level. 
Furthermore, the reduction in excess readmissions penalties associated with this policy 
change will decrease the need for hospitals to shift the cost burden to other revenue 
sources. 
In summary, this literature review addressed the issue of how socioeconomic 
status relates to excess readmissions.  Dharmarajan et al. (2013) reveal that readmission 
rates are not influenced by demographic factors or timing; leaving differences in 
readmission rates to be explained by other factors that historically have not been 
considered, such as socioeconomic status.  Furthermore, Joynt and Jha documented 
differences in excess readmission penalties among hospital types. They note that larger 
teaching hospitals are more likely to receive higher penalties than non-teaching hospitals 
(2013).  Several authors explain the difference in readmission rates as a function of 
patient socioeconomic characteristics (Mueller et al. 2013, and Shahian et al. 2012, 
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Philbin et al 2001, Shimizu et al. 2014). Utilizing this research, the MEDPAC report 
presents a solution that indirectly adjusts for hospital patient mix to more fairly calculate 
excess readmission penalties.   
Building on this literature, an economic framework describing how hospitals are 
being unequally penalized due to variations in patient mixes is presented in the following 
chapter.  The impact of socioeconomic status on readmission rates for AMI in South 
Carolina is calculated by hospital type using a model of the type described by the 
MEDPAC report.  The estimated readmission rates are then used to determine the 
reduction in excess readmissions penalties, which would reduce the need for cost shifting 
at larger teaching hospitals.  It is hypothesized that by controlling for the heterogeneity in 
patient mix among hospitals, a more equitable readmission penalty threshold standard can 
be developed that will reduce the need for hospitals to cost-shift. 
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CHAPTER III 
CONCEPTUAL MODEL 
I. Introduction
The literature discussed in the previous chapter focused on hospital readmissions.  
Building on that literature, this chapter considers the organization and structure of 
hospitals. There are three main types of hospitals in the healthcare market. They are for-
profit, not-for-profit, and government owned.  Although the share of for-profit hospitals 
has been growing (a 2.2% increase between 2006 and 2010 (AHA, 2012)), the revenue 
share of not-for-profit hospitals across all U.S. hospitals still exceed 50%. According to 
the 2015 American Hospital Association's annual review of Healthcare Statistics, 51.1% 
of U.S. hospitals are non-governmental not-for-profit, followed by 21.5% government 
owned, 18.6% for-profit, and the remaining 8.8% comprised by psychiatric, long-term 
care, and prison hospitals.(AHA, 2015).  
This chapter presents a brief review of hospital structures, and discussion of the 
theory and behavior of these various hospital structures.  A theoretical framework is then 
presented to better understand the current dynamics of hospital readmissions and the 
likely effect of revising the current metrics for assessing penalties for excess 
readmissions. 
II. Unique Nature of Medical Markets
As Arrow (1963) stated "The first step in the analysis of the medical care market 
is the comparison between the actual market and the competitive model (pp 943-944)." 
The demand side of the health care market diverges from the traditional competitive 
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model on the basis of uncertainty in demand for medical care, asymmetric information 
inherent in the physician patient relationship, and the requirement that hospitals provide 
emergent care to all patients without regard of ability to pay.  Building on the latter of 
these traits, Arrow states "Departure from the profit motive is strikingly manifested by 
the overwhelming predominance of nonprofit over proprietary hospitals (p. 950)."  Stated 
differently, traditional mechanisms (prices and quantities) dictating the allocation of 
goods and services to their most efficient outcomes are not always apparent in the 
structure of the medical care market due to institutional health care policies.  In 
particular, healthcare providers and hospitals receive substantial subsidies for providing 
care to various groups deemed to be disadvantaged by lack of income or other factors.  
Such subsidies are absent in competitive neo-classical markets.  
Hospital and the medical care markets are not fully subject to traditional neo-
classical supply and demand characteristics. Instead of the traditional two party system of 
buyer and seller, the U.S. health care system is primarily a three party system.  The three 
parties include the consumer, or patient, which receives the medical care, the insurance 
provider (private or public) that pays for the care, and the physician and hospital that 
provide the care.  The three party system differs from traditional markets where the 
consumer and firm are directly linked.  
The supply side of the health care markets is predominantly comprised of not-for-
profit hospitals (51% in 2013).  However, the diverse mix of patient needs and abilities to 
pay promoted an industry structure comprised of nonprofit, for-profit, and government 
owned hospitals. One explanation for this organizational structure is how hospitals arose 
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to meet patient demands.  As Horwitz (2005) explains, for-profit hospitals provide the 
most profitable services to patients that can pay.  While government owned are more 
likely to offer unprofitable services, not-for-profit hospitals seek to balance the types of 
services offered (Horwitz, 2005). Horwitz notes a very important aspect of the behavior 
of nonprofit hospitals is the balance that must be maintained between treating patients 
able to pay with patients unable to pay.  The diverse mix of patients at nonprofit hospitals 
is often a legal requirement for these hospitals to maintain their nonprofit status (Horwitz, 
2015).  The primary reason for this is that nonprofit hospitals receive governmental 
subsidies to adjust for the level of uncompensated care provided.  The medical care 
market also diverges from traditional markets by the existence of demand for medical 
care at no cost being met with supply from nonprofit hospitals.   
This intricate balance of nonprofit hospitals providing care to those with and 
without ability to pay raises interesting questions as to what nonprofit hospitals optimize. 
Nonprofit hospitals cannot simply maximize the quantity of profitable services provided 
because of the requirement to offer some quantity of unprofitable services (Horwitz, 
2015).  Thus, nonprofit hospitals often balance the value of prestige gained by providing 
care to underinsured and uninsured patients against the cost of the prestige (Chang and 
Jacobson, 2011).  The notion of nonprofit hospitals motivated by prestige is revisited 
later in this chapter.  First, it is important to review existing theories on nonprofit 
hospitals.   
Provided that the market is comprised of different hospital structures, there is an 
extensive literature on what these varying hospital structures seek to optimize.  For-profit 
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hospitals can be expected to maximize the quantity of profitable services they provide.  
However, the optimization decisions for nonprofit hospitals are more complex and have 
been debated in the literature for decades (Newhouse, 1970, Chang and Jacobson, 2011). 
An outline of the theories governing the goals of nonprofit hospitals (i.e., what 
they seek to maximize in an optimization framework), as provided by Horowitz and 
Nichols (2007), is reviewed here. In 1970, Newhouse proposed a model in which 
nonprofit institutions maximize output and prestige by providing additional health care 
services up to the point where marginal profit is zero.  Newhouse cites prior studies that 
found hospitals operate optimally when they optimize the tradeoff between the quality of 
care provided and the number of patients they care for within a constrained operating 
budget (McNerney 1962, Long 1964).   
Horowitz and Nichols then describe the role of a nonprofit hospital among other 
hospital types within a geographic region. They postulate that if "...neighbors [other 
hospitals] are driven more by profit motives, then the nonprofit will tend to treat less 
profitable patients (p. 4, 2007)."  This assertion raises the important question of how 
nonprofit hospitals might behave given the diversity of hospital types within a region.  
Weisebrod (2009), Salamon (1995), and Frank and Salkever (1991) all argue that 
nonprofit hospitals seek to maximize the total value of care in the presence of market 
failures (e.g. failure of competition through the three-party system, inadequate allocations 
of resources) and governmental failures (e.g. inadequate access to care).  Thus, nonprofit 
hospitals are designed to satisfy unmet community health needs by providing services to 
patients who generate small, zero, or negative profits.  To compensate for accepting and 
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treating non-profitable patients, additional revenue is generated from more profitable 
services provided to patients with the ability to pay (directly or more often through 
insurance coverage), a practice termed "cost shifting." The conventional definition of cost 
shifting is provided by Dranove (1988) states that hospitals increase charges to privately 
insured patients to offset losses from Medicaid or Medicare reimbursements. 
Pauly and Redisch (1973) argue that some nonprofit hospitals are for-profit 
hospitals in disguise, in that they maximize payments to "privileged employees" (hospital 
executives and physicians) as a proxy for maximizing profits.  Profit maximization under 
a competitive equilibrium framework is Pareto efficient when social efficiency is 
maximized.  Pareto efficiency is reached when it is impossible to improve the welfare of 
one without reducing the welfare of another (Varian 1984).  The presence of cost shifting 
in medical care markets foregoes Pareto efficiency through a reduction in welfare of 
patients with the ability to pay for medical care as a result of covering the full cost of care 
for those without the ability to pay.  As Arrow alluded to, prices and quantities in the 
medical care market are not always efficiently allocated. Compounding these issues, the 
inefficient outcome resulting from cost shifting might also be the result of the United 
State's three party healthcare system.  The fact that hospitals can privately negotiate with 
insurance markets allows for distorted incentives where prices vary between providers 
and insurers for the same services (Wyden 2009, Hyman 2007). Because healthcare 
markets are not perfectly competitive, and thereby do not efficiently allocate resources to 
their highest valued use, there may be potential for Pareto improvements.  
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Other theoreticians argue the optimal healthcare policy objective function should 
optimize the additive sum of two health care agents.  For example, Hirth (1997,1999) 
presents a model in which two types of hospitals, those that seek profits and those that do 
not, maximize collective hospital profit over both hospital types.  Nonprofit status acts as 
a signal for increased quality and may drive low-quality for-profit hospitals out of the 
market.  Hirth argues that low-quality for-profit hospitals attempt to exploit the market 
failure of asymmetric information based on the perception that high quality institutions 
charge higher prices because they provide superior care. The theory provided by Hirth 
argues that some patients are poorly informed on the quality of hospitals, resulting in 
'information heterogeneity'.  Hirth claims that poorly informed patients are potentially 
exploited by hospitals providing care of "quality which is not consistent with the price 
charged" (1997).   However, this theory is not useful for understanding hospital behavior 
in the presence of Medicare reimbursement penalties stemming from excess hospital 
readmissions because for-profit hospitals typically have lower readmission rates due to 
their ability to turn down care for poor and socioeconomically disadvantaged patients 
(Joynt and Jha 2013). 
Hirth's key finding for our purpose is that hospitals (especially nonprofit 
hospitals) seek to maximize prestige, where prestige is an increasing function of patient 
numbers (Newhouse 1970).  In particular, nonprofit hospitals maximize an objective 
function that includes altruistic motives along with the traditional profit motives.  Two 
primary explanations exist for why a nonprofit hospital will maximize an objective 
function that includes prestige gained from altruistic care.  First is the legal requirement 
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of nonprofit hospitals to provide care to the uninsured (Horwitz, 2015). The second 
explanation is more theoretically ambiguous.  Rosenman, Li, and Friesner (2000) posit 
that nonprofit hospitals optimize prestige through maximizing revenues subject to a 
constraint that it must cover cost.  Doing so, with the given patient mix at nonprofit 
hospitals, requires optimization to occur in one of two ways.  Either the nonprofit hospital 
provides higher private prices and lower public volumes, or lower private prices and 
higher public volumes in response to reduced public payments (Rosenman, Li, and 
Friesner 2000).   This explanation demonstrates how nonprofit hospitals may shift costs 
in order to optimize prestige.  Furthermore, it illustrates the ability of nonprofit hospitals 
to care for the uninsured (through increased prestige) while maintaining its ability to 
cover costs (through cost shifting).  However, their assumption that a hospital can 
maximize revenue by changing multiple factors, volumes and prices to public and private 
payers, might inherently suggest that the hospital is acting as a for-profit rather than non-
profit.  Rosenman, Li, and Friesner's latter suggestion that hospitals may reduce private 
prices in response to reduced public payments falls directly in line with the work of Hay 
(1983) and Foster (1985) which state such behavior will be seen among for-profit 
hospitals. To further explore how prestige maximizing hospitals function in the market 
for medical care, the work done by Becker (1974) provides insight. 
A reinterpretation of Gary Becker's (1974) seminal essay "A Theory of Social 
Interactions" provides a unique perspective on the prestige motive. Becker posits a 
"synthetic family" with a benevolent member providing charity "motivated by a desire to 
improve the general well-being of recipients" (p. 1083). The charitable member is 
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assumed to be motivated by social acclaim. Stated another way, charitable members are 
motivated by social prestige gained from charitable actions.  Becker continues by stating 
that charitable members "redistribute giving until everyone losing was fully compensated 
and everyone gaining was fully 'taxed' " (pp1083-1084). Becker concludes that in a 
family with a charitable giver, all members would try to maximize "family" opportunity 
and "family" consumption.  The notion of "family" members working together implies a 
degree of social interaction, which, as Becker states, is ignored by traditional neoclassical 
theory.  Moreover, Becker astutely notes: "Therefore, considerable ad hockery would be 
required if the 'conventional' approach were to explain the evidence on charitable giving 
that is more readily explained by an approach that includes social interactions" (p1085). 
Expanding the scope of Becker's work, the "synthetic family" can be translated to 
the market for medical care where charitable members are interpreted as nonprofit 
hospitals. The nonprofit hospitals acting as charitable givers seek to maximize prestige 
through redistribution by providing uncompensated care to the uninsured and 
underinsured patients in need of medical care from excess revenues derived from 
privately insured patients. Stated more simply, nonprofit hospitals are able to provide 
"charity" care by shifting costs.   
Extending Becker's work on "synthetic families" with a charitable giver did not 
originally translate to the medical care market.  However, Bergstrom (1995) notes Becker 
borrowed concepts from the theory of the firm to explain production of his "synthetic 
family."  Moreover, using Becker's theory of charitable giving in the setting of a 
"synthetic family" to describe the composition of hospitals in the market for medical care 
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is a reasonable application of his original work.  The modeling of the medical care market 
needs an analytic framework that allows hospitals to be viewed as agents who optimize 
prestige in the provision of uncompensated care to the underinsured and uninsured. 
 With the concept of nonprofit hospitals acting as prestige optimizers, a more 
complete theory of cost shifting is needed to explain redistribution in the setting of 
private and public payers comprising nonprofit hospital demand. Furthermore, a model 
explaining cost shifting as a function of the unique patient mix at nonprofit hospitals, 
coupled with the readmission discussion in Chapter II, is needed to understand the impact 
on hospital reimbursements.  
III. Optimization of Nonprofit Hospital Model 
 The behavioral model developed here allows for the possibility of cost shifting.  
Hay (1983) and Foster (1985) assumed hospitals act as profit maximizing institutions 
where "marketing efforts" by the hospital are used to offset reduced government 
reimbursement. Consistent with prior discussion, it is assumed that hospitals do not act as 
a neo-classical profit maximizer (Arrow 1963, Varian 1984, Wyden 2009, Hyman 2007). 
Instead, hospitals act as price discriminators using cost-shifting to offset reductions in 
government reimbursements (Hadley and Feder 1985). 
 Dranvoe (1988) provides the foundation of the model used in this research to 
analyze the equity of current readmissions penalties.  Dranove improves and builds upon 
the assumption that hospitals act as price discriminators through cost-shifting in the 
presence of reduced government reimbursements.  He assumes that nonprofit hospitals 
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serve two markets, i for private payers, and j for public payers.  The hospital then chooses 
prices to maximize the following utility function 
                                                                 (3.1) 
where   ,    are prices charged to groups i and j;   ,    are the costs to treat groups i and 
j;     ,   represent the quantity of services provided to groups i and j; and       are the 
profits gained from the two groups respectively (i for private payers, and j for public 
payers). It is assumed that the hospital gains utility from profits in the form of monetary 
profits from private payers, 
  
   
  , and altruistic utility, or prestige, by providing 
uncompensated care from public payers (consistent with Newhouse, Becker) or 
  
   
     
Per unit medical care cost for the two groups are assumed to be identical, i.e., the cost is 
equal for resources used on a privately insured person versus a publicly insured person.  
Because nonprofit hospitals cannot deny service to the publicly insured population,    is 
exogenous.     is also assumed to be fixed and exogenously determined by government 
payments.  Collectively, these assumptions limit the choice of    as the sole means of 
utility maximization in 3.1. Note that for-profit or private hospitals may choose to refuse 
admittance to some individuals who could potentially be in   , whereas all nonprofit 
hospitals are unable to decline care to any individual in group    or   . This assumption 
is reasonable because many private hospitals have the ability to turn away the uninsured, 
or patients with government (eg. Medicare, Medicaid) provided "public" insurance. 
 Nonprofit hospitals, which maximize utility gained from monetary profits from 
private payers and prestige from public payers, are forced to balance the patient mix in 
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the presence of readmission penalties. The incentive to cost shift will remain greatest in 
states that have chosen to not expanded Medicaid eligibility because the proportion of 
patients in group    will remain large.  Ironically, many "opt-out" states serve large 
proportions of poor and indigent patients (larger proportion in group    relative to   ) .  
Moreover, the pressure on nonprofit hospitals in such states to cost shift will increase as 
federal payments subsidizing the costs of uncompensated care are decreased over time.  
 Returning to Becker's concept of "family" and how nonprofit hospitals can be 
viewed as a charitable member of the "family". Nonprofit hospitals have the ability to set 
   at a utility maximizing level to redistribute potential revenue shortfalls in    as a 
result of less than full cost reimbursement by government (Becker, Sloan, 2000). 
Theoretically, this is likely when nonprofit hospital's reimbursements are reduced due to 
excess readmissions rates resulting from the high proportion of low income patients they 
care for.  The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, defines readmission rates as 
excessive when a single hospital's readmission rate exceeds the national average.  
Because of the characteristics of their patients, nonprofit teaching hospitals often receive 
less than full reimbursements due to high readmission rates and the financial penalty 
associated with excess readmissions. 
 The first order condition sufficient for optimal    is satisfied where the marginal 
utility of a price change equals the marginal utility from the loss of output to the private 
markets (Dranove, 1988).  The presence of cost shifting is demonstrated by total 
differentiating the first-order condition, and restricting profits to be positive and non-
decreasing in the private market; thus 
   
   
     which is cost shifting trade-off (Dranove, 
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1988; Sloan, 2000).  Allowing both    and    to vary, a theoretical hospital "...recovers 
from private paying patients some of the lost profits from government patients" (Dranove, 
1988).  Or as Becker stated, the "charitable" nonprofit hospital seeks to maximize utility 
from profits and prestige by redistributing cost among private and public payers.  
 Public payers (coverage through Medicare or Medicaid) and indigents (who are 
unable to pay for medical services) tend to be sicker, on average, when admitted to a 
hospital and thus are more likely to be readmitted.  Therefore, a hospital readmission 
penalty which does not account for the proportion of indigent and publicly insured 
patients admitted by certain hospitals will likely result in higher readmission penalties for 
hospitals serving a large proportion of indigent and publicly insured patients.  To 
compensate for this revenue loss, these hospitals will attempt to shift costs to offset 
reduced reimbursement and gain prestige. Modifying the readmissions penalty algorithm 
to control for the proportion of poor patients admitted would effectively standardize the 
calculation of the critical readmission rate threshold to account for differences in patient 
socio-demographic characteristics. Recalling that nonprofit hospitals represent the 
majority of hospitals in the medical care market, it is appropriate to adjust the excess 
readmissions penalty algorithms to account for nonprofit hospitals' large proportion of 
publicly insured and uninsured patients.   
 Development of a more comprehensive readmissions penalty measure will level 
the hospital playing field and no longer put hospitals that serve a high proportion of low 
income patients at a competitive disadvantage. A change in the readmissions penalty 
algorithm can be achieved by comparing excess readmission rates to stratified group 
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averages as expressed by the MEDPAC report (2013) where the stratified groups are 
comprised of hospitals with similar proportions of indigent and publicly insured patients.  
Reducing the readmissions penalty effectively increases the reimbursement to hospitals 
and reduces the incentive to shift cost to the private payers.  It is hypothesized that 
grouping hospitals by proportions of indigent and publicly insured patients will result in a 
marginal decrease in reimbursement penalty attributable to differences in patient mix. 
The development of a more comprehensive measure of calculating excess hospital 
readmissions that controls for patient characteristics is necessary to accurately identify 
hospitals providing sub-standard care. The improved measure is needed before the 
important goal of achieving reductions in health care cost through reductions in patient 
readmissions can be realized by the Hospital Readmission Reduction Program (HRRP).  
  Traditionally, federal transfers called 'disproportionate share hospital payments' 
have limited cost shifting among hospitals serving a relatively large proportion of 
uninsured patients. As the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act expands insurance 
coverage, there should be less uninsured patients and less uncompensated care provided 
by hospitals. However in 2012, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled the Medicaid expansion 
provision is a state option rather than a federal requirement.  Thus, leaving large 
proportions of uninsured patients in states that "opt-out" of Medicaid expansion. The 
situation is complicated by reductions in payments to hospitals providing uncompensated 
care when readmission rates are excessive.  For example, the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act contains provisions to decrease federal healthcare payments to states 
in the form of reduced disproportionate share hospital payments each year from FY2014-
 36 
 
FY2020.  Neuhausen et al. reported that even in a state (California) that did expand 
Medicaid eligibility, nonprofit hospitals were still confronted with a cost burden due to 
differences in the cost of uncompensated care and the reduced disproportionate share 
hospital payments (2014). Thus, states opting to expand their Medicaid program 
eligibility are confronted with a potential additional cost burden, but states that did not 
expand coverage are likely to face much larger cost burdens for uncompensated care.  
 Reductions in disproportionate share hospital payments do not account for states 
choosing to expand or not expand Medicaid eligibility.  As a result, hospitals in "opt-out" 
expansion states are more likely to increase the degree of cost shifting through price 
discrimination than states where Medicaid eligibility has been expanded.   Ultimately, 
until the United States moves to a single payer healthcare system, or all citizens are 
provided with some universal level of insurance, there will continue to be a mix of 
patients (based on ability to pay) that will necessitate the need for the nonprofit hospital 
structure. Furthermore, nonprofit hospitals will continue to act as a charitable "family" 
member providing healthcare to low income patients by redistributing costs among 
private, public, and uninsured patients.  Therefore it is imperative to adjust the 
readmission penalty structures to account for these differences in patient mix.  
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CHAPTER IV 
METHODS 
 This chapter presents the methods used to analyze the effect of patient mix on 
readmission rates among for-profit and nonprofit hospitals. The analysis will make use of 
South Carolina state-wide database for teaching and non-teaching hospitals maintained 
by the South Carolina Office of Research and Statistics. For the purposes of this analysis, 
teaching hospitals serve as a proxy for nonprofit hospitals, and non-teaching hospitals 
serve as a proxy for for-profit hospitals. The data can be stratified by hospital type and 
patient characteristics that allows for analysis of these factors on the probability of 
readmission.   
 The literature supports the need to stratify readmission analysis by hospital 
teaching status to more accurately understand differences in the hospital-type readmission 
rates (Joynt and Jha 2013, Shimizu 2014, Muller 2013, Shahian 2012).  Stratification by 
hospital type is necessary to control for the influence of differences in patient mix and 
their hypothesized impact on pricing decisions.  Chapter III outlined how prestige 
optimization at nonprofit, or teaching, hospitals may lead to cost shifting as a result of 
reduced public reimbursement for uncompensated care and increased readmissions rates.  
 The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), a branch of the 
Department of Health and Human Services, currently assess readmission penalties by 
comparing readmission rates for a given hospital to the national average by multiple 
chronic disease conditions and major joint replacement categories.  However, nonprofit 
teaching hospitals generally have a patient mix that is poorer, lacks health insurance and 
 38 
 
tends to be more ill than patients cared for in other hospitals.  The current CMS penalty 
calculation ignores differences in hospital patient mix, which unfairly inflates the 
readmission rate of otherwise high quality nonprofit teaching hospitals.    
 Readmission rates are estimated for the South Carolina database using the current 
method of calculating excess readmissions.  These results are then compared to the 
readmission rates based on the method proposed by the Medicare Payment Advisory 
Committee (MEDPAC, 2013), that indirectly incorporates a measure of socioeconomic 
status into excess readmission calculations.  Comparing the two methods for calculating 
hospital readmission rates will shed light on inappropriateness of using a uniform 
procedural standard that does not consider hospital type and/or patient mix when 
calculating if a hospital has an excess readmission rate. Failure to control for patient mix 
can result in an unfairly high excess readmission rate for hospitals that have a high 
proportion of low income patients but provide very high quality patient care. 
 
I. Data 
 To accurately analyze hospital readmissions, an extensive longitudinal data set 
that follows patients through entire episodes of chronic illnesses is required.  A large 
patient population is also necessary to accurately estimate statistically significant 
differences between patient subgroups with the same medical condition.  Hospital 
readmissions for chronic illnesses are analyzed in this study because they often require 
numerous hospital admissions to treat.  Prior to 2015, chronic illnesses included in the 
CMS readmissions penalty calculations consisted of acute myocardial infarction (AMI), 
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heart failure, and pneumonia. In 2015, readmissions penalties were expanded to include 
total knee and total hip arthroplasty, as well as exacerbations of chronic obstructive 
pulmonary disease.  
 With any disease or illness that may require hospital readmission the initial care 
level and subsequent patient management are of primary importance.  The Hospital 
Readmissions Reduction Program (HRRP) is designed to improve the quality of care 
provided by hospitals during the initial admission including appropriate discharge 
education and out-patient care.   
 South Carolina hospital readmissions and the inherent quality of care provided is 
analyzed using data obtained from the South Carolina Office of Research and Statistics 
(ORS).  The data set contains all payer hospital claims for all patients with any index 
admission for an acute heart attack (AMI), heart failure, or pneumonia from January 1, 
2007 through December 31, 2011 in the state of South Carolina.  All payer claims refer to 
complete hospitalizations for any individual regardless of insurance status. Only the data 
for patients with a hospital admission for a primary diagnosis of AMI during the study 
period are included in this study.  For this set of patients, all other hospitalizations during 
the study period are also included in the data set. The demographic variables consist of 
age, race, and sex.  Hospital level variables include size (measured by the number of 
hospital beds), trauma status (Level 1, 2...), teaching status (yes/no), and urban or rural 
location. Patient variables consist of primary diagnosis, admission source (emergency 
department, direct admit, transfer), admission date, discharge date, insurance payer, and 
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length of stay.  If a patient died during the study period, their data is excluded. These 
variables, and others included in the dataset, are fully described in Appendix C. 
 Several variables were created from the data set for analytical purposes, beginning 
with hospital readmissions. For AMI patients, the guidelines from CMS (Center For 
Medicare and Medicaid Services) and HRRP (Hospital Readmission Reduction 
Program), define a readmission as a subsequent hospitalization, to the same or different 
hospital, for any reason within 30 days of the initial admission with a primary diagnosis 
of an acute heart attack (AMI).  If a patient is readmitted more than once within the 30-
day period following an index hospitalization, only the first readmission is counted in the 
penalty calculation. This is an important distinction related to the chronic nature of AMI 
and frequency of hospitalizations. It is not uncommon for a patient to be admitted 
multiple times within 30-days of an initial AMI, hence the necessity for reducing such 
multiple readmissions as they are a burden on the healthcare system. 
  Binary variables were created to identify index hospitalizations, hospital 
transfers, and readmissions within 30 days.  Index hospitalization is defined as the 
primary hospitalization where a patient is admitted and receives care. The primary 
hospitalization may be the hospital to which a patient was transferred. Hospital transfers 
are important to identify because if a patient is admitted at one hospital then transferred 
to another hospital, and the second hospital treats and discharges the patient, the second 
hospital is considered the index hospital. All readmissions are charged against the index 
hospital.  In general, only certain hospitals in South Carolina have the ability to treat AMI 
patients. These patients are often transferred to teaching (nonprofit) hospitals for 
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treatment.  For example, a patient that suffers an acute heart attack in a rural area will be 
rushed to the emergency room of a small rural hospital to be stabilized. Once the patient 
is stabilized, he or she is subsequently transferred to a larger hospital with a better 
capability to treat them.  The second hospital is the index hospital. 
 A continuous variable for the time (days) to readmission was also created.  All 
variables and subsequent analyses were carried out using the statistical software R 
(version 3.0.2, r-group).  The detailed computer code is provided in Appendix A.  Once 
the data were arranged and organized properly, a series of iterative, multistep logical 
functions were created to determine if an individual patient was transferred after an 
admission for AMI (acute myocardial infarction).  Similar logical functions were also 
created to determine if the patient was then readmitted to any hospital within 30 days of 
discharge from the previous admission, and the timing (days) between the previous 
discharge and subsequent readmission.   
 The variables created, as well as inclusion and exclusion criteria were followed as 
closely as possible to the CMS defined methods and guidelines (YNHHSC, 2014).  CMS 
exclusion criteria for determining hospital readmissions include index hospitalization 
length of stay greater than 120 days and patients 18 years of age and older.  For example, 
if a patient is less than 18 years of age on admission to the hospital, or if a patient is 
hospitalized longer than 120 days, they are excluded from the excess readmission 
calculation. 
 Additionally, it is not unusual for a patient to be readmitted multiple times within 
30 days for various exacerbations stemming from the index AMI admission. In such 
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situations, only the first readmission within 30 days, following an index admission for 
AMI is counted in the excess readmission calculation. Once the 30-day period is over, the 
readmission window will only start again if there is another index admission for AMI, 
and subsequent readmission. Additionally, to be counted, the patient must stay in the 
hospital at least 24 hrs, or overnight, otherwise the admission is excluded. Patients that 
arrive in the emergency department (ED) and are discharged, or patients admitted for 
observation are not considered as readmissions for penalty calculations.  For example, a 
patient has an index admission for AMI and 7 days later arrives at the ED for 
dehydration, or shortness of breath.  This patient is considered an "outpatient" unless 
he/she is admitted to a bed in the hospital. Only patients staying in the (ED) overnight, or 
for longer than 24 hours are considered a readmission for penalty calculations.  It has 
been hypothesized (Zuckerman et al., 2016) that some hospitals attempt to circumvent 
possible readmission penalties by holding these patients in "observation."  For hospitals, 
patients can be held in observation to monitor status without actually being admitted.  
This issue is further discussed in Chapter 6. 
 Another CMS defined exclusion criteria concerns patients transferred from 
another hospital. If a patient is transferred from another hospital, skilled nursing facility, 
or any other medical care source, the initial hospitalization is not counted as a 
readmission, only the index hospital that treats and discharges the patient is considered 
for a possible readmission penalty.  Only patients with an inpatient hospital stay that 
arrived via emergency department or clinical referral (direct admit) are considered in this 
analysis.  
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 For a hospital to be included in the HRRP they must have at least 25 index 
admissions for AMI in any three-year period.  As a result, only 48 of South Carolina's 63 
hospitals are represented in the AMI hospital population. (The identification code for 
hospitals with 25 or more index admissions and exclusion of those hospitals with fewer is 
provided in Appendix B).  
 Table 4.1 summarizes the demographic information for the AMI population used 
in this analysis. This table represents only the index hospitalizations and demographic 
information for an acute heart attack, AMI.  The denominator for the reported 
percentages of gender, race, transfer and payment type in Table 4.1 and Table 4.2 is the 
total number of index hospitalizations for each respective groups.  The final data set 
contains 13,793 AMI hospitalizations of which 12,875 are index AMI hospitalizations for 
11,062 unique patients, with a median age of 55 years.  The index AMI population is 
predominantly white (71.0%), male (68.3%), with commercial insurance (42.0%).  
Roughly 17.5% of the index AMI admissions in the study population resulted from a 
hospital transfer. The demographics are representative of the state of South Carolina and 
thus may not be reflective of national or other state averages. For payment type, the 
"Other" category is comprised of workers compensation, health maintenance 
organizations, health resources services administration programs, and managed care 
organizations. 
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Table 4.1 Patient Demographics for AMI Hospitalizations Only 
No. AMI Hospitalizations 13,793 
No. Index AMI Hospitalizations 12,875 
No. Unique Patients 11,062 
No. Hospitals 48 
Age (years) 
 
 
Mean ± SD* 53.3 ± 8.0 
 
Median(IQR**) 55 (48, 60) 
Male, No. (%) 8,788 (68.3) 
Race, No. (%) 
 
 
White 9,140 (71.0) 
 
African-American 3,288 (25.5) 
 
Other 447 (3.5) 
Transfers, No. (%) 2,257 (17.5) 
Payment Type, No. (%) 
 
 
Self Payment 2,540 (19.7) 
 
Medicare 2,567 (19.9) 
 
Medicaid 246 (1.9) 
 
Commercial Insurance 5,404 (42.0) 
 
Indigent 1,155 (9.0) 
  Other 963 (7.5) 
Note: All values in parentheses are percentages other than median age  
that contains the interquartile range of 25th and 75th percentiles. 
*SD= Standard deviation, **IQR= interquartile range. N=12,875, total 
number of Index AMI admissions 
 
 As previously discussed, hospital readmission penalties impact nonprofit teaching 
hospitals more than non-teaching hospitals due to their patient mix. In this study, 
payment type is used to proxy for patient mix.  Medicaid and indigent patients are 
considered to be low income patients. The AMI patient population was stratified by 
teaching and non-teaching hospitals, which serve as proxies for nonprofit and for-profit 
hospitals.  
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 Table 4.2 reports the demographic characteristics for the South Carolina AMI 
patient population by hospital type. The number of hospitalizations far exceeds the 
number of patients because most AMI patients undergo multiple hospitalizations. All 
subsequent readmissions for patients originally admitted as an AMI patient are included, 
which include readmissions for any cause.  The purpose of Table 4.2 is to describe the 
patients and hospitalizations among teaching and non-teaching hospitals for the AMI 
population.  Both teaching and non-teaching AMI patients have similar average values 
for age, proportion of males, and distribution by race.  Due to the large sample size all 
demographic variables are significantly different between hospital types (alpha level = 
0.001), thus the p-values for the difference between hospital types are not reported.   
 A total of 5,431 index AMI hospitalizations were to teaching hospitals, compared 
to 7, 444 to non-teaching hospitals. Similar to the overall index population, both teaching 
and non-teaching index AMI admissions are comprised of predominantly white males 
with commercial insurance. 
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Table 4.2: Demographics for Patients With Any AMI Admission and All Other 
Hospitalizations During the Study Period Stratified by Teaching Status 
    Teaching  Non-Teaching 
No. All Hospitalizations 28,664 45,919 
No. Index AMI Hospitalizations 5,431 7,444 
No. Unique Patients 3,423 7,639 
No. Hospitals 8 40 
Age (years) 
  
 
Mean ± SD 53.2 ± 8.0 53.4 ± 8.5 
 
Median(IQR) 54 (47, 60) 55 (46, 59) 
Male, No. (%) 3,712 (68.3) 5,076 (68.2) 
Race, No. (%) 
  
 
White 3,842 (70.7) 5,298 (71.2) 
 
African-American 1,424 (26.2) 1,864 (25) 
 
Other 165 (3.0) 282 (3.8) 
Transfers, No. (%) 1,088 (20.0) 1,169 (15.7) 
Payment Type, No. (%) 
  
 
Self Payment  923 (17.0) 1,617 (21.7) 
 
Medicare 1,161 (21.4) 1,406 (18.9) 
 
Medicaid 124 (2.3) 122 (1.6) 
 
Commercial Ins. 2,139 (39.4) 3,265 (43.9) 
 
Indigent 718 (13.2) 437 (5.9) 
  Other 366 (6.7) 597 (8.0) 
Note: All values in parentheses are percentages other than median age  
that contains the interquartile range of 25th and 75th percentiles. 
*SD= Standard deviation, **IQR= interquartile range, N=12,875, total number 
of Index AMI admissions 
 
 As expected, teaching hospitals have a higher rate of transfers than non-teaching 
hospitals (20.0% versus 15.7%).  Furthermore, a key difference between teaching and 
non-teaching hospitals is the proportion of "Indigent" patients (13.2% versus 5.9%).  The 
larger indigent population among teaching hospitals is because they are often nonprofit 
safety-net hospitals which receive federal funding reimbursing them for treating the poor. 
For-profit and non-teaching hospitals have the right to refuse care to those unable to pay. 
Teaching hospitals have a slightly higher percentage (2.3%) of Medicaid patients than 
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non-teaching hospitals (1.6%) and Medicaid coverage is another indication of 
disadvantaged socioeconomic status. 
 The mix in patient types and severity of illness should be considered before 
proxying hospital quality using simple average readmission rates. Although readmission 
rates are adjusted for patients' comorbid conditions, the common measure for hospital 
quality is their average readmission rate relative to the national average, which ignores 
the hospital's patient composition (proportion of indigent, Medicare/Medicaid, 
commercial insurance, etc.)  However, the literature shows (Shimizu 2014, Muller 2013, 
Shahian 2012), socioeconomically disadvantaged patients tend to be sicker and are 
among the most likely to be readmitted to the hospital. This discrepancy results in higher 
readmission rates for hospitals with a large proportion of indigent, and Medicaid patients 
relative to the national average proportion.    
 Penalizing nonprofit teaching hospitals for excessive readmissions attributable to 
uniquely different patient populations results in a flawed excess readmission rate 
calculation. Penalties imposed on hospitals having an excess readmission rate, in the form 
of reduced Medicare reimbursements, imposes a financial deficit on affected hospitals, 
which is often filled through cost shifting. Large teaching hospitals are nonprofit 
institutions that must cover costs while operating within the bounds of a fixed operating 
margin (Horowitz, Nichols 2009).  To maintain budget and remain within an operating 
margin, hospitals negotiate pricing contracts with large insurance providers based on their 
expected patient mix (Horowitz, Nichols 2009) thereby shifting losses from Medicaid and 
indigent patients to privately insured patients.  
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 The ability of a hospital to cost-shift is especially important for South Carolina's 
nonprofit teaching hospitals that price as if they are prestige optimizing, "charitable" 
family members in the medical care market (Becker, 1974; Hirth, 1999).  A large 
indigent and Medicaid population exists in South Carolina. Therefore, the state's 
nonprofit hospitals have the burden of providing uncompensated care for this population, 
which is exacerbated by a flawed hospital readmission penalty calculation (Garfield et al., 
2016).  Even though nonprofit teaching hospitals may gain utility through prestige of 
treating the indigent population, it usually requires cost-shifting to cover cost.   
 Many solutions to this problem exist, perhaps the simplest being to expand 
Medicaid eligibility for all individuals up to 138% of the federal poverty level (as 
originally stated in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010), which would 
at least, to a degree, alleviate the problem.  Medicaid does not typically cover the full-
cost of patient care, but it does cover a significant portion (Barr, 2011).  However, in 
2015, South Carolina rejected this option. Another approach to reduce the incentive for 
hospitals to cost-shift is to redesign the formula that calculates excessive readmission and 
the subsequent Medicare reimbursement penalties. Accepting South Carolina's 
distribution of private, public, and uninsured patient as fixed, reductions in cost shifting 
behavior can be made by adopting a hospital readmission penalty structure similar to the 
one proposed by MEDPAC (2013).   
 The remainder of this chapter presents the methods for comparing nonprofit and 
for profit hospitals as a function of teaching status.  The analytic foundation for 
comparing hospital readmission rates and penalties for excess readmissions is presented.  
 49 
 
This information is then used to determine how the hospital readmission rate is affected 
by patient mix at each hospital type. 
 
II. Statistical Methods 
 Using the patient demographic data and hospital level data, a standard logistic 
regression model and resulting odds ratios are calculated to determine how various 
demographic and hospital characteristics impact the likelihood of readmission. 
Readmission to the hospital is represented by (    ), where             ,  such that      
                
      
   
         
   
                                             (4.1) 
 where   
   is a vector of predictor variables (  
   and associated parameters (   that 
captures the impact of changes in    on    (Green 2003). From equation 4.1, the 
likelihood function 
                                                           
        
     
                                           (4.2) 
is maximized where     
  
  when     , or       
  
   when     . A forward 
step-wise regression technique was used to determine a model that can no longer be 
improved by adding an additional predictor variable (Hocking 1976). To interpret the 
impact of the independent predictor variables on the probability of hospital readmission 
the odds ratios are calculated using the estimated coefficients      Hosemer-Lemeshow 
test is used to determine goodness of fit for the logistic regression (Hosemer et al. 2013) 
 To evaluate the possible time sensitive reasons for hospital readmissions (and 
hence excessive or penalized readmissions from policy and cost viewpoints), a Cox 
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Proportional Hazards model is employed to estimate hazard ratios for the various 
socioeconomic factors influencing hospital readmission. The specification of the semi-
parametric Cox Proportion Hazards model requires selecting a set of covariates that are 
multiplicatively related to the hazard ratio (Greene 2003). The baseline hazard rate 
represented by   , is 
                
         .                                               (4.3) 
Equation (4.3) allows for estimation of   for a vector of covariates.  Now assume that K 
unique readmission times exist,        , where    is a specific number of days and 
     .  Next assume    is the risk set containing all individuals who have not been 
readmitted in at least time    days, ∀ i       where      .  The probability of a patient 
being readmitted at time   , given that exactly one patient has been readmitted at this 
time is 
                          
   
  
  
  
  
    
                                      (4.4) 
Equation (4.4) allows for the estimation of the partial likelihood function, 
           
         
  
     
 
                                               (4.5) 
in which exactly one individual exits at each distinct time with no censored observations 
(Green 2003).  However if multiple individuals   exit at distinct time intervals, then the 
log-likelihood function represents the sum of terms for each individual patient.  
Estimating the partial likelihood function in (4.5) allows for estimation of the hazard 
ratios for the covariates in relation to time to hospital readmission.  The analysis 
presented here is a standard Cox Proportional Hazards model applied to the context of 
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hospital readmissions (Greene 2003).  Results of the hazard ratios, presented in Chapter 
V, estimate the effect of the demographic variables, teaching status, and insurance status 
have on the time to readmission.   
 The study data uses two approaches to estimate the excess readmission rate and 
subsequent reimbursement penalty.  The first approach is suggested in the MEDPAC 
report and the second uses the current CMS policy. The MEDPAC report hypothesizes 
that the current CMS risk adjusting methodology, which does not include a 
socioeconomic adjustment for patient characteristics, excessively penalizes hospitals with 
an above average proportion of poor patients. The MEDPAC study found that low 
income is a more consistent predictor of hospital readmission than age, sex, or race.  
Therefore adjusting readmissions rates for income status should result in a more 
meaningful standardized comparison (MEDPAC, 2013).  It is also hypothesized that a 
superior estimate for standardized hospital readmission average rates will reduce 
reimbursement penalties for teaching hospitals and thus, reduce the degree of cost 
shifting to privately insured patients.  
 The statewide data used for this study does not contain a measure of 
socioeconomic status.  Thus to compare hospitals in a similar manner to the MEDPAC 
report, the data are stratified by the proportion of indigent and Medicaid patients a 
hospital serves.  The MEDPAC report proxies socioeconomic status using the proportion 
of patients at each hospital on Supplemental Security Income (SSI), stratified into deciles, 
however that data is not available for this study.  Thus, the proportion of poor (indigent 
and Medicaid) patients served by each hospital is used to proxy for socioeconomic status 
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in this study.  Each patient's "method of payment" is used to proxy for socioeconomic 
status.  Poor patients are defined as patients who are either indigent (unable to pay) or 
patients on Medicaid, which is government subsidized health insurance coverage for 
unemployed and those with very low income. To calculate the proportion of poor patients 
a hospital serves, the sum of indigent and Medicare patients was divided by total hospital 
admissions in each hospital.  Using a procedure similar to the MEDPAC report, Each of 
the 48 South Carolina hospitals in the AMI data set were then stratified into quintiles 
based on the proportion of poor patients they treated to create appropriate groups for 
analysis.  Table 4.3 provides the quintiles, number of hospitals, and range of the 
proportions of poor patients served. These quintiles will serve as individual comparison 
groups, whereby each hospital's readmission rate will be compared to the quintile 
average, in addition to the statewide average under the original CMS protocol.  
Table 4.3: Quintiles by Proportion of Poor Patients 
Quintile No. Hospitals 
Proportion Poor Patients* 
(%) 
1 9 4.74 - 7.52 
2 9 7.69 - 9.49 
3 10 9.57 - 11.15 
4 10 11.31 - 15.64 
5 10 15.68 - 21.55 
* Ranges for the proportion of poor patients, calculated as 
the proportion of Indigent and Medicaid AMI patients 
served by the hospital during the study period.  
 
 The stratification of the 48 South Carolina hospitals into quintiles shown in Table 
4.3 will serve as the basis of the group level comparison of readmission rates presented in 
the forest plots in Chapter V (Figures 5.2-5.6). While Tables 4.1 and 4.2 show rates of 
Indigent and Medicaid to be much lower than these proportions, it is important to note 
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that these are the proportions of Indigent and Medicaid at any one specific hospital, 
which are then stratified into quintiles. 
 In the next chapter, a series of forest plots are constructed to analyze the overall 
and quintile hospital readmission rates.  A hospital is determined to have 'excess 
readmissions' if the lower bound of the 95% confidence interval for its readmission rate is 
above the state-wide average (original CMS method), or quintile group average 
(MEDPAC, quintile level method). The quintile-level results are then compared to the 
average state-wide excess readmission rate. Table 4.3 reports the proportion of poor 
patients for the 48 hospitals across quintile groups.   
 The two procedures presented here are used to determine when a hospital 
readmission rate is excessive. By comparing two methods for determining excess 
readmission rates, light will be shed on the degree to which 'excess' readmissions are 
driven by the population share of low income patients a hospital cares for. The 
calculation of excess hospital readmissions as determined by the two approaches is a 
secondary outcome.  The primary outcome is the amount of the penalty, which is a 
function of the estimated readmission rate.  It is not the fact of being penalized that is of 
importance, but rather the amount of the penalty that can be hypothetically attributed to 
the proportion of poor patients a hospital serves. The dollar value penalty a hospital 
receives is a function of having an excess readmission rate and the difference between the 
hospitals estimated readmission rate and the reference readmission rate.  When the 
reference rate is changed due to an alternative means of estimating excess readmission 
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(state-wide readmission rate versus the quintile-level readmission rate) the dollar value of 
the penalty changes.  
 Due to the loss of independence by using each hospital's readmission data to 
estimate an single aggregate state-wide readmission rate to which each hospital was then 
compared to, additional analysis was conducted to decouple individual hospitals from the 
aggregate state-wide readmission rate. The loss of independence here is that the weighted 
average state-wide readmission rate is comprised of each of the 48 hospital's data, to 
which the individual hospitals are compared for penalty determination. Thereby making 
the aggregate state-wide average dependent upon each hospital's readmission data. To 
evaluate the empirical analysis, each of the 48 hospital's readmission rates were re-
sampled with replacement 1,000 times using nonparametric bootstrapping methods
1
. The 
resulting 1,000 bootstrapped readmission rates were built using each hospital's sample 
size (the number of index AMI admissions), and the empirical readmission rate.  
Additionally, 95% confidence intervals were estimated for each of the 1,000 estimated 
readmission rates for all 48 hospitals. The bootstrapping process allows for analysis of 
the 48,000 bootstrapped hospital samples to be compared to 1,000 state-wide averages, as 
well as 5,000 quintile group averages (1,000 for each quintile) as a means of evaluating 
the empirical analysis. Sample code outlining these processes can be found in Appendix 
D.  Creating 1,000 state-wide readmission rates for comparison was done to mitigate the 
loss of independence present in the empirical analysis.   
                                                 
1
 R package "bootstrap" 
2
 Note: "other insurance" category is comprised of workers compensation, health maintenance 
organizations, health resources services administration programs, and managed care organizations. 
3
 The primary reason for using 5 years of data rather than 3 is because the data used in this study contains 
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 While these bootstrapping techniques are built on the empirical data, the process 
allows for retesting the study hypothesis.  Consistent with the initial hypothesis, the 
hypothesis tested with the boot-strapped samples is that the quintile method, which 
controls for patient socio-economic factors (income), will result in a lower excess 
readmission rate than using the state-wide average rate as the frame of reference for 
determining excess hospital readmission rates.  Thus, the excess readmission penalty will 
be less with the quintile method.  Testing the hypothesis using the 1,000 bootstrapped 
samples allows for a more robust analysis than if only the collected data set was used to 
empirically test the maintained hypothesis. If the resulting bootstrapped analysis reveals a 
similar pattern of readmission rates, and shows similar reduction in excess readmission 
related penalties from the state-wide average compared to the quintile level averages, 
then the empirical results can be accepted with greater confidence.  
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CHAPTER V 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
I. Introduction 
 An accurate calculation of a hospital's readmission rate is critical to the success of 
the Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program (HRRP).  The hospital readmission rate 
determines whether or not a hospital has excess readmissions, and the degree to which 
the hospital is financially penalized.  In fiscal year 2013, the maximum Medicare 
reimbursement penalty was 1% for excess readmissions.  The maximum penalty was 
increased to 2% in fiscal year 2014 and further increased to 3% in 2015.  The number of 
diagnostic categories subject to excess readmissions penalties has been increasing.  In 
2015, hospitals can be penalized for excess readmissions for patients with acute 
myocardial infarction (AMI), heart failure, pneumonia, chronic obstructive pulmonary 
disease, total knee arthroplasty, and total hip arthroplasty.  With the potential for 
penalties being assessed in each of these categories, it is imperative to accurately 
determine a standard hospital readmission rate for each diagnostic category by 
controlling for patient characteristics. 
 Extensive discussion in prior chapters pertaining to differences in hospital 
structure and patient composition highlight the importance of these factors in estimating 
excess hospital readmission penalties.  Chapter III provides insight into optimization 
decisions among for-profit and nonprofit hospitals and how these optimization decisions 
are driven by patient mix.  Nonprofit hospitals care for higher proportions of Medicaid 
and indigent patients than for-profit hospitals, which indicate they incorporate prestige in 
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their optimized decision.  Here, prestige is a function of the quantity and quality of care 
provided to those without regard for ability to pay.  The notion of prestige differs from 
optimization at for-profit hospitals that maximize profits as a function of increased 
patient numbers. The disparities in patient mix are documented in chapter IV for a sample 
of South Carolina hospitals that revealed a significantly higher proportion of indigent 
patients admitted to teaching hospitals than nonteaching hospitals (8.9% versus 3.2%). 
Incorporating a measure of patient composition into excess readmissions penalties may 
reduce cost shifting among nonprofit teaching hospitals.   
 To test this hypothesis, excess readmission rates are analyzed under the existing 
national average method as well as the method proposed in the MEDPAC (2013) report. 
The MEDPAC report represents the collaborative efforts of The Centers for Medicare 
and Medicaid Services (CMS) and the Yale New Haven Health Services Corporation to 
design an improved readmission measure for determining hospital quality (YNHHS, 
2014).  The following analysis adheres to these guidelines as closely as possible to 
accurately identify hospitals with excessive readmissions in the South Carolina data base.  
 
II. Results 
 A logistic regression analysis was conducted to determine which demographic 
and hospital level factors influence the likelihood of readmission. The resulting odds 
ratios and 95% confidence intervals of the logistic regression are presented in Table 5.1. 
The Hosmer-Lemeshow test indicated that the logistic regression model is well calibrated 
and correctly specified (p-value=0.989).  
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 The condition number (a diagnostic tool testing for the existence of 
multicollinearity, or high correlation between predictor variables) in the logistic 
regression is 15.64, which indicates the model does not suffer from multicollinearity 
among the independent variables. Multicollinearity in regression analysis can be a 
problem when strong correlation among predictor variables highly influences the 
coefficient estimates.  In the logistic regression model presented in Table 5.1, age is not 
included in the model due to strong correlation with Medicare (correlation coefficient of 
0.874).  Including age in the regression results in a condition number of 712.3, indicating 
strong multicollinearity (any condition number greater than 30 is indicative of 
multicollinearity (Pesaran, 2015)). Running the two models side by side, one including 
age and one without, provides a comparison of the impacts of multicollinearity. R code 
for each regression is found in Appendix H. Removing the age variable eliminates 
multicollinearity while leaving coefficients of other predictor variables relatively 
unchanged; an indication that multicollinearity existed in the previous model, yet it had 
very little impact on the model as a whole. Additionally, while the coefficients and odds 
ratios were relatively unchanged the standard errors were shown to be reduced by 
removing the multicollinearity. A matrix of correlation coefficients among the 
independent variables in the logistic regression is presented in Appendix D. 
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Table 5.1 Odds Ratios and 95% Confidence Intervals for 30-Day AMI 
Readmissions 
  Odds Ratio 95% Confidence Interval 
Intercept* 0.1616 (0.1204, 0.2146) 
Female* 1.1494 (1.0496, 1.2581) 
Self-Payer 0.8898 (0.7379, 1.0765) 
Medicare* 1.4586 (1.2182, 1.7531) 
Medicaid* 1.4746 (1.0767, 2.0058) 
Commercial Insurance 0.8889 (0.7485, 1.0604) 
Indigent 1.0465 (0.8456, 1.2967) 
White 1.0871 (0.8538, 1.4014) 
African American 1.2652 (0.9854, 1.6433) 
Teaching Hospital* 1.4015 (1.2849, 1.5284) 
*Variables significant at alpha =0.05 include the intercept, female,  
 Medicare, Medicaid, and teaching hospitals indicated by a 95% confidence  
interval not containing the value of one. N= 12,875, the number of Index 
AMI Hospitalizations  
 
 Results presented in Table 5.1 show that publicly funded Medicaid and Medicare 
patients are much more likely to be readmitted (47% and 46% more likely) than "other 
insurance" patients
2
. Females in South Carolina are 15% more likely than males to be 
readmitted to the hospital following an admission for AMI.  Additionally, one of the most 
important statistical results is that patients at teaching hospitals are 40% more likely to be 
readmitted than patients at non-teaching hospitals.  This result can be partly explained by 
the differences in the mix of insurance providers and severity of illness among patients 
cared for at teaching hospitals compared to non-teaching hospitals (Mueller et al. 2013, 
and Shahian et al. 2012, Philbin et al 2001, Shimizu et al. 2014).  These findings set up 
the comparative analysis between teaching and non-teaching hospitals throughout the 
remainder of this chapter.  
                                                 
2
 Note: "other insurance" category is comprised of workers compensation, health maintenance 
organizations, health resources services administration programs, and managed care organizations. 
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 A more comprehensive logistic regression model could either include hospital 
teaching status as random effect, or as an interaction term with Indigent and  Medicaid.  
This might provide more evidence to support the hypothesis that the patient composition 
among teaching hospitals is associated with increased likelihood of readmissions. 
Furthermore, the Medicare variable could be stratified into 2 populations, the standard 65 
and older population, and the less than 65 population with serious disabilities or 
comorbid health conditions. 
  Table 5.2 reports the overall hospital readmissions rates and timing (in days) to 
readmission for the 48 hospitals in the data set.  Data represented in Table 5.2 show the 
crude number readmitted as well as the percentage readmission and time to readmission 
(measured in days). The focus of this table is a descriptive analysis of the readmitted 
population, and shows how readmission rates differ by gender, race, and insurance 
payment type, as well as how the time to readmission might differ among those 
categories.  
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Table 5.2: Index AMI Readmissions Rates and Timing for all South 
Carolina Hospitals 
    
N 
(Admitted) 
Readmission 
(%) 
Timing 
(days) 
Overall    12,875 19.7 14.5 ± 8.8 
Range Among Hospitals - 2.6 - 28.2 0 - 30 
Male 
 
8,788 18.7 14.7 ± 8.7 
Female 
 
4,087 21.8 14.1 ± 8.9 
Race 
    
 
White 9,140 18.8 14.5 ± 8.8 
 
African-American 3,288 22.6 14.5 ± 8.7 
 
Other 447 16.8 13.0 ± 9.0 
Payment Type 
   
 
Self Payment 2,540 17.7 14.1 ± 8.6 
 
Medicare 2,567 26.5 14.6 ± 8.9 
 
Medicaid 246 28.5 13.2 ± 8.8 
 
Commercial Insurance 5,404 17.1 14.7 ± 8.9 
 
Indigent 1,155 20.3 14.4 ± 9.0 
  Other 963 18.5 14.0 ± 8.8 
All timing values other than range are reported as Mean ± SD, in days.  
N= 12,875, the number of Index AMI admissions.  
 
 
 Across all 48 hospitals, the arithmetic mean readmission rate for AMI patients is 
19.7%, and individual hospital readmission rates range from 2.6 % to 28.2%.  When 
stratified by gender, females are readmitted more frequently than men (21.8% versus 
18.7%). African-Americans have the highest readmission rate at 22.6%, followed by 
whites at 18.8%, and all other race/ethnicity classes at 16.8%.  
 Insurance status provides an interesting breakdown of readmissions rates.  The 
self-payer readmission rate and the commercial insurance readmission rate are the two 
lowest rates at 16.5% and 16.9%.  Medicare patients have the second highest readmission 
rate of 25.9%, most likely because these patients are usually older and often seriously ill. 
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Patients receiving Medicare are usually 65 years of age or older, except for patients with 
certain disabilities, including end stage renal disease, Lou Gehrig's disease, and patients 
receiving Social Security Disability Insurance Payments, who receive coverage 
regardless of age (Barr, 2011).  Medicaid patients are readmitted most frequently at 
27.8%. Indigent patients have the third highest readmission rate of 20.1%.  Medicaid 
patients and the indigent are poorer, often sicker patients with higher than average 
readmission rates.  Medicaid and indigent patient status is used to proxy for low income 
socioeconomic status in this analysis.  
 Time to readmission was calculated to determine if there is a difference in time to 
readmission by payment type, where payment type is a proxy for patient mix.  Average 
time to readmission across most groups is roughly 14 days, with the exception of 
Medicaid patients who are readmitted one day earlier on average.   
 Hospital-level readmissions rates and time to readmission across demographic 
groups for teaching and non-teaching hospitals are reported in Table 5.3.  Pearson's chi-
squared tests are used to determine differences in readmission rate between teaching 
hospitals and non-teaching hospitals across the demographic variables. Student's t-test are 
used to determine differences in time to readmission across the reported demographic 
variables.  Any p-value < 0.05 is considered to be statistically significant. Similar to 
results regarding AMI readmissions, there is not a significant statistical difference 
between teaching and non-teaching hospitals with regard to the average number of days 
to readmission.  Neither demographic nor insurance considerations affect the length of 
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time to readmission between the two hospital types.  This general result is further 
analyzed using the Cox Proportional Hazards model. 
 An example interpretation of Table 5.3, out of all Male index AMI admissions to 
teaching hospitals, 782, or 21.1% were readmitted. All other values can be interpreted in 
a similar manner.
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Table 5.3: Percent Readmissions and Average Timing To Readmission for Teaching and Non-Teaching Hospitals Index AMI Hospitalizations 
    Teaching (N=8) Non-Teaching (N=40) P-values 
    
N 
(Admitted) 
Readmission 
(%) 
Timing 
(days) 
N 
(Admitted) 
Readmission 
(%) 
Timing 
(days) 
Readmission 
(%) 
Timing 
(days) 
Overall 5,431 22.2 14.4 ± 9.0 7,444 18.0 14.6 ± 8.6 < 0.001 0.346 
Range Among Hospitals - 13.2 - 24.2 0 - 30 - 2.6 - 28.2 0 - 30 - - 
Male 
 
3,712 21.1 14.4 ± 9.0 5,076 16.5 14.9 ± 8.6 0.001 0.336 
Female 
 
1,719 24.2 14.0 ± 9.2 2,368 20.1 14.2 ± 8.6 < 0.001 0.710 
Race 
         
 
White 3,842 21.4 14.5 ± 9.1 5,298 16.9 14.5 ± 8.6 <0.001 0.910 
 
African-American 1,424 24.0 14.0 ± 8.8 1,864 21.5 15.0 ± 8.5 0.097 0.112 
 
Other 165 20.0 12.6 ± 9.4 282 14.9 13.5 ± 9.0 0.207 0.576 
Payment Type 
        
 
Self Payment 923 19.8 14.0 ± 8.8 1,617 16.5 14.2 ± 8.5 0.036 0.856 
 
Medicare 1,161 27.6 14.3 ± 9.0 1,406 25.7 14.8 ± 8.7 0.302 0.529 
 
Medicaid 124 37.1 13.9 ± 8.8 122 19.7 12.0 ± 9.0 0.004 0.382 
 
Commercial Insurance 2,139 19.0 14.2 ± 9.1 3,265 15.9 15.1 ± 8.6 0.004 0.134 
 
Indigent 718 23.4 14.9 ± 9.1 437 15.1 13.2 ± 8.8 < 0.001 0.194 
  Other 366 20.5 13.7 ± 9.5 597 17.3 14.0 ± 8.2 0.242 0.711 
Note: "other insurance" category is comprised of workers compensation, health maintenance organizations, health resources services 
administration programs, and managed care organizations. N= 12,875, the number of Index AMI admissions, 5,431 at Teaching Hospitals, 
7,444 at Non-Teaching Hospitals
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 Medicaid and indigent patients were readmitted in higher proportions with more 
variability in time to readmission than patients with other insurance providers as shown 
in Table 5.3. Table 5.3 also reveals that Medicaid (p-value=0.004) and indigent patients 
(p-value < 0.001) have higher readmission rate at teaching hospitals than non-teaching 
hospitals.  Other forms of insurance payment, including commercial insurance, do not 
show significant differences in readmission rates between teaching and non-teaching 
hospitals. Differences in readmission rates for the Medicaid populations is roughly 17.4% 
(37.1%-19.7%), and 8.3% (23.4%-15.1%) for the indigent populations, compared to less 
than 5% for all other forms of insurance payment between teaching and non-teaching 
hospitals. The overall readmission rate is significantly higher at teaching hospitals 
(22.1%) than non-teaching hospitals (18.0%, p-value < 0.001).  Based on the literature 
(Mueller 2013, Shahian 2012,  Philbin 2001, Lindenauer 2013)  and the analysis 
presented here, the difference in readmission rates between teaching and non-teaching 
hospitals is likely to be partially attributable to patient mix and not exclusively hospital 
quality.  
 The results in Table 5.3 support the hypothesis that exogenous differences in 
patient mix between nonprofit teaching hospitals and non-teaching hospitals influence the 
rate of readmission for a given illness.  The dominant driver in the readmission rate 
difference between hospital types is likely attributable to the differences in patient mix 
between teaching versus non-teaching hospitals. Statistical support for this statement is 
found in the significant differences in readmission rates for the poorer patient classes 
(Medicaid, and indigent insurance provider) than patients in higher income classes. The 
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limited number of hospitals studied, 8 teaching and 40 non-teaching, presents a statistical 
limitation which is addressed later in this chapter. The prior descriptive analysis presents 
a strong case to modify the current hospital penalty calculations for excess readmission 
rates fail to account for differences in exogenous patient mix.  
Due to the similarity in timing of readmission across most demographic and 
teaching categories as presented in Tables 5.2 and 5.3, a Cox Proportional Hazards model 
was estimated to disentangle the relationship between demographic characteristics and 
time to patient readmission.  The resulting hazard ratios and 95% confidence intervals for 
this analysis is presented in Table 5.4.  
Table 5.4: Cox Proportional Hazards Results for Time to 
Readmission 
Hazard 
Ratio 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
Age 0.9964 (0.9914, 1.0014) 
Male 0.9753 (0.8997, 1.0573) 
White 0.9192 (0.7335, 1.152) 
Black 0.9252 (0.7332, 1.1675) 
Self Pay 0.9674 (0.8144, 1.1492) 
Medicare 0.9442 (0.8012, 1.1128) 
Medicaid 1.0469 (0.798, 1.3735) 
Commercial Insurance 0.9074 (0.7746, 1.0629) 
Indigent 0.9117 (0.7513, 1.1062) 
Teaching Hospital 0.9840 (0.9099, 1.0642) 
Note: All estimates are insignificant at alpha = 0.05 level.          
N= 12,875, the number of Index AMI Hospitalizations 
For each included variable in the Cox Proportional Hazards model, the null 
hypothesis is that each categorical variable does not affect the timing of readmission. 
Failure to reject the null hypothesis is illustrated by a 95% confidence interval containing 
the value of one.  The alternative hypothesis is that there is an impact, either positive or 
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negative, is represented by a 95% confidence interval either entirely above or below the 
value of one. Hazard ratios represent the ratio of readmission rates corresponding to the 
levels of the explanatory variables. The Cox Proportional Hazards model  indicates that 
the timing of patient readmissions to the hospital are not influenced by the analyzed 
demographic factors or by hospital teaching status because the 95% confidence intervals 
for the calculated hazard ratios all contain the value of one.  These findings support 
Dharmarajan et al. (2013) where no significant difference was found in the rate, or 
timing, of readmissions when analyzed by demographic characteristics. 
 While the timing of a readmission may not be correlated to socioeconomic factors 
or hospital teaching status, the logistic regression results indicate that socioeconomic 
factors and hospital teaching status do contribute to likelihood of readmission. The latter 
is the most relevant with regard to possible policy changes. For a given hospital deemed 
to have "excess" readmission which would result in a reimbursement penalty, as 
discussed in chapters I and II, the lower bound on the 95% confidence interval for the 
hospital readmission rate must exceed the national hospital readmission average 
(YNHHSC, 2014).  Hospitals are penalized when their readmission rates for any 
diagnosis category (acute myocardial infarction, heart failure, pneumonia, chronic 
obstructive pulmonary disease, total knee arthroplasty, and total hip arthroplasty) exceed 
the national average rate. In the subsequent analysis, excess readmission rates are subject 
to the penalty structure provided by Yale New Haven Health Services (2014), for South 
Carolina hospitals with excess AMI readmissions.  
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 Appendix E reports the summary data for the 48 South Carolina hospital's AMI 
admissions, the number of AMI readmissions, the proportion of AMI readmissions and 
the percentage of poor patients. Appendices E and F provide summary data used in the 
following forest plots and quintile analysis reported in this chapter.  In this analysis, 
under current protocol, a hospital is considered to have an excess readmission rate if a 
hospital's lower bound for the 95% confidence interval for its AMI readmission rate is 
above the state-wide average. Here, the state-wide average is the total number of 30-day 
readmissions divided by the total number of index AMI admissions for the state (19.0%).  
The statewide average is a weighted average based on the number of AMI patients each 
hospital treats relative to the total number of AMI patients in the state. Using the 
weighted average for these comparisons is considered superior to a simple numeric 
average across all individual hospital rates because it takes into account differences in the 
number of AMI admissions in each of the 48 hospitals, which ranges from 33 to 1,476. 
Appendix F reports both methods of calculating the reference average readmission rates 
relative to the percentage of poor patients in each quintile.  Under the proposed 
MEDPAC protocol, a hospital is considered to have an excess readmission rate if the 
hospital's lower bound for the 95% confidence interval for its AMI readmission rate is 
above its quintile average.  The 95% confidence intervals are calculated using the 
standard calculation for a sample proportion.
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 Figure 5.1: Forest Plot of all Hospital Readmission Rates and 95% Confidence Intervals. 
Note: Each horizontal line represents the readmission rate (black box) and 95% 
confidence interval of each hospital as indicated by the vertical axis.  The vertical red line 
represents the weighted average state wide readmission rate =19.03%. Penalized hospitals 
are represented by hospitals whose entire 95% confidence interval is to the right of the 
vertical red line. 
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 The average readmission rate for the analyzed South Carolina hospitals is 19.0% , 
and is denoted by the vertical red line in Figure 5.1.  The horizontal axis for Figure 5.1 
through Figure 5.6 is readmission rate, and the vertical axis represents hospitals by 
identification number. Among the 48 analyzed hospitals, 8 are teaching hospitals and 40 
are non-teaching hospitals.  The readmission rate for these 48 hospitals range from 2.6% 
to 28.2%.  Applying the standard CMS approach (comparison to the state-wide 
readmission rate) reveals that 7 (14.6%) of the 48 hospitals have excess readmissions 
(i.e., the lower confidence interval bound for each of the hospitals exceeds the state-wide 
rate of 19.0%) and would incur reimbursement penalties under the current excess hospital 
readmission methodology. Recall, under the CMS methodology, the reference 
readmission rate is the nation-wide average rate.  Given that only state-wide data is 
available, this study substitutes the state-wide readmission rate for the national reference 
rate. Another difference in this analysis is the readmission data for South Carolina's AMI 
population spans the years 2007-2011, whereas the CMS procedure calculates the nation-
wide readmission rate on a 3 year moving average basis
3
.  Of the 7 South Carolina 
hospitals that would be penalized under existing CMS methodology when the average 
state-wide rate is used as the reference, four are teaching hospitals (4 out of 8) and three 
(3 out of 40) are non-teaching hospitals.  Thus, 50.0% of teaching hospitals have excess 
readmission rates compared to only 7.5% of non-teaching hospitals when the unadjusted 
state-wide average rate is used to determine excess readmission.   
                                                 
3
 The primary reason for using 5 years of data rather than 3 is because the data used in this study contains 
all payers rather than a true Medicare database. Moreover, the data base used here contains a sample of 
Medicare patients in South Carolina rather than all Medicare hospitalizations. 
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 Current CMS protocol does not include any measure of socioeconomic status, a 
risk adjustment procedure, when estimating excess hospital readmission rates and 
subsequently assessing reimbursement penalties.  Historically, a major reason for not 
including an adjustment for patient mix, is the belief that a socioeconomic patient 
adjustment will mask differences among hospitals and reduce hospital incentives to 
improve the quality of care for vulnerable populations (YNHHSC, 2014).  While this 
may be a valid point, the issue is much larger than the quality of care provided to this 
"vulnerable" population.  The population of poor patients arrives at various hospitals in 
an exogenously heterogeneous manner.  Thus, the current method of calculating excess 
readmission penalties negatively impacts larger teaching hospitals to a greater degree due 
to inherent characteristics of their patients beyond their control.  
 Chapter II reviewed the Medicare Payment Advisory Committee (MEDPAC, 
2013) report, which outlined an alternative method for adjusting readmission penalties to 
include the proportion of poor patients served by a hospital.  The authors of this report 
found that the share of low-income patients is a strong predictor of hospital readmissions.  
Thus, in this study, the percentage of poor patients (i.e., indigent and Medicaid patients) 
at each hospital were stratified into quintiles (as reported in Table 4.3) to proxy for and 
isolate the relationship between the share of low income patients and hospital 
readmission rate.   
 An overall readmission rate for each of the five quintiles was calculated. Each 
hospital's average readmission rate and 95% confidence interval was calculated and 
compared to the weighted quintile average readmission rate the hospital belonged to, to 
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determine if the hospital had an excess rate of readmissions relative to similar hospitals.  
The first quintile summarizes the AMI readmission values for hospitals having the lowest 
proportion of poor patients, and the fifth quintile summarizes the AMI readmission rates 
for hospitals with the highest proportion of low income patients.  
Figure 5.2: Forest Plot for Quintile 1 (Hospitals with the lowest proportion of poor 
patients) Hospital Readmission Rates and 95% Confidence Intervals 
Note: Quintile 1 represents hospitals with the lowest proportion of poor patients (Indigent 
and Medicaid) in South Carolina.  The proportion of low income patients in quintile 1 
ranged from 4.74% to 7.52%. Each horizontal line represents the readmission rate (black 
box) and 95% confidence interval of each hospital as indicated by the vertical axis.  The 
vertical red line represents the first quintile weighted average readmission rate of 16.89%. 
Penalized hospitals are represented by hospitals whose entire 95% confidence interval is 
*
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to the right of the red line. *Denotes hospitals deemed to have excessive readmission 
rates based on the quintile approach. 
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 Figure 5.2 uses a forest plot to report the confidence intervals for the 9 hospitals 
in the first quintile. The percentage of poor patients served by hospitals in the first 
quintile range from 4.74% to 7.52%.  The 9 hospitals had an overall weighted average 
readmission rate of 16.89%, as indicated by the vertical red line.  Of the 9 hospitals, only 
one (Non-Teaching Hospital 33) had a readmission rate where the lower bound of the 
95% confidence interval was above the average quintile readmission rate of 16.89% 
deeming that hospital to have excess readmissions (i.e., the one hospitals with its 
confidence interval entirely to the right of the vertical red line). The one teaching hospital 
in this quintile did not have excess readmissions using the quintile criteria. 
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Figure 5.3: Forest Plot for Quintile 2 (hospitals with the second lowest proportion of poor 
patients) Hospital Readmission Rates and 95% Confidence Intervals 
Note: Quintile 2 represents hospitals with the second lowest proportion of poor patients 
(Indigent and Medicaid) in South Carolina. The proportion of low income patients in the 
second quintile ranged from 7.69% to 9.49%. Each horizontal line represents the 
readmission rate (black box) and 95% confidence interval of each hospital as indicated by 
the vertical axis.  The vertical red line represents the second quintile weighted average 
readmission rate of 20.37%. Penalized hospitals are represented by hospitals whose entire 
95% confidence interval is to the right of the red line. *Denotes hospitals deemed to have 
excessive readmission rates based on the quintile approach. 
*
* 
*
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The forest plot in Figure 5.3 displays readmission rates and confidence intervals 
for the second quintile that includes those hospitals with between 7.69% and 9.49% 
Medicaid or indigent patients.  The second quintile also includes 9 hospitals and the 
overall weighted average readmission rate is 20.37%.  Of the 9 hospitals, three (Non-
Teaching Hospitals 38 and 39, and Teaching Hospital 8) have excess readmission rates 
relative to the quintile rate, including one teaching hospital. Unexpectedly, the second 
quintile has the highest readmission rate among the five quintiles despite the fact that this 
quintile has a relatively low proportion of Medicaid and indigent patients. This anomaly 
is likely a function of the state-wide data presented here rather than reflective of a nation-
wide dataset. As the MEDPAC (2013) report to Congress showed, readmission rates are 
directly correlated to the proportion of poor patients with each group level readmission 
rate increasing as the proportion of poor patients increases. It is assumed that there will 
be a stronger positive correlation between readmission rates and the proportion of 
Medicaid and indigent patients as sample size increased from state-wide data to a 
nationally representative database. If this not the result, then additional research will be 
needed to explain this unexpected outcome. 
The forest plot in Figure 5.4 displays readmission rates and confidence intervals 
for the third quintile that represents hospitals with a proportion of Medicaid and indigent 
patients ranging from 9.57% to 11.15%.  The third quintile contains 10 hospitals with an 
average weighted readmission rate of 19.43%.  Of the 10 hospitals in this quintile, two 
have excess readmission rates, both are teaching hospitals (Hospital 6 and Hospital 7.) 
77 
Figure 5.4: Forest Plot for Quintile 3 (hospitals with the third lowest proportion of poor 
patients) Hospital Readmission Rates and 95% Confidence Intervals 
Note: Quintile 3 represents hospitals with the third lowest proportion of poor patients 
(Indigent and Medicaid) in South Carolina. The proportion of low income patients in the 
third quintile ranged from 9.57% to 11.15%. Each horizontal line represents the 
readmission rate (black box) and 95% confidence interval of each hospital as indicated by 
the vertical axis.  The vertical red line represents the third quintile weighted average 
readmission rate of 19.43%. Penalized hospitals are represented by hospitals whose entire 
95% confidence interval is to the right of the red line. *Denotes hospitals deemed to have 
excessive readmission rates based on the quintile approach. 
*
* 
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The forest plot illustrated in Figure 5.5 displays readmission rates and confidence 
intervals for the fourth quintile that represents hospitals having a proportion of Medicaid 
and indigent patients between 11.31% to 15.64%.  The fourth quintile includes 10 
hospitals that have an average weighted readmission rate of 18.30%.  Among the 10 
hospitals, one (Non-Teaching Hospital 40) has an excess readmission rate relative to the 
quintile average rate. 
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Figure 5.5: Forest Plot for Quintile 4 (hospitals with the second highest proportion of 
poor patients) Hospital Readmission Rates and 95% Confidence Intervals 
Note: Quintile 4 represents hospitals with the second highest proportion of poor patients 
(Indigent and Medicaid) in South Carolina. The proportion of low income patients in the 
fourth quintile ranged from 11.31% to 15.64%. Each horizontal line represents the 
readmission rate (black box) and 95% confidence interval of each hospital as indicated by 
the vertical axis.  The vertical red line represents the fourth quintile weighted average 
readmission rate of 18.3%. Penalized hospitals are represented by hospitals whose entire 
95% confidence interval is to the right of the red line. *Denotes hospitals deemed to have 
excessive readmission rates based on the quintile approach. 
*
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Figure 5.6 displays the forest plot of readmission rates and confidence intervals 
for the fifth quintile that represents hospitals with the highest proportion of Medicaid and 
indigent patients.  The proportion of poor patients at these 10 hospitals ranges from 
15.68% to 21.55%.  The overall weighted readmission rate for the 10 hospitals in the fifth 
quintile is 20.19%.  Among the 10 hospitals, one (Teaching Hospital 5) has an excess 
readmission rate and this one hospital is a teaching hospital.  
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Figure 5.6: Forest Plot for Quintile 5 (hospitals with the highest proportion of poor 
patients) Hospital Readmission Rates and 95% Confidence Intervals 
Note: Quintile 5 represents hospitals with the highest proportion of poor patients 
(Indigent and Medicaid) in South Carolina. The proportion of low income patients in the 
fifth quintile ranged from 15.68% to 21.55%. Each horizontal line represents the 
readmission rate (black box) and 95% confidence interval of each hospital as indicated by 
the vertical axis.  The vertical red line represents the fifth quintile weighted average 
readmission rate of 20.19%. Penalized hospitals are represented by hospitals whose entire 
95% confidence interval is to the right of the red line. *Denotes hospitals deemed to have 
excessive readmission rates based on the quintile approach. 
*
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The preceding descriptive analysis provides a procedure for determining when a 
hospital has an excess readmission rate that allows the administrative agency to control 
for exogenous patient mix characteristics that influence patient remittance.  These patient 
characteristics are independent of overall hospital care quality but influence hospital 
readmission rates.  Although this approach does not directly risk adjust for 
socioeconomic status, hospitals are grouped by the proportion of poor patients served 
thereby providing a means of addressing differences in patient mix among hospitals.  
Comparing the readmission rate of a hospital in each quintile group to their quintile 
average partially removes the impact of patient mix on readmission status while 
maintaining a standard of patient care.  
Figure 5.1 through Figure 5.6 provide a visual means to identify hospitals that 
have excess readmission and therefore would be penalized (i.e., hospitals with the entire 
95% confidence interval to the right of the vertical average quintile rate line) as well as 
hospitals that would not be penalized (i.e., hospitals with 95% confidence intervals that 
cross the vertical average line or are to the left of the vertical line).  However, these 
graphics do not provide a clear measure of the degree to which each hospital will be 
penalized.  Penalties for excess readmissions result in a percentage reduction in Medicare 
reimbursements.  CMS currently uses a proprietary algorithm, which translates the degree 
to which a hospital's excess readmission rate is above the national rate into a downward 
payment adjustment.  The maximum downward adjustment factor is 3%. In this analysis, 
excess readmissions penalties are calculated as the distance between a hospitals average 
readmission rate and the state-wide (or quintile based) average readmission rate.  Using 
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this methodology, excess readmission penalties are estimated for the current penalty 
structure (state-wide) and compared to the proposed penalty structure (quintile based). 
The estimated penalty calculation in this analysis is the difference between hospital 
readmission rate and comparative in-state quintile level average readmission rate. This 
procedure is not representative of the traditional Medicare reduction penalty used by 
CMS, which is a function of the overall average (not quintile average) rate. The crude 
penalty calculation used for this analysis is the average excess readmission rate in 
percentage terms for all hospitals having excess readmission in a given quintile. For 
example, if 3 hospitals in a quintile have excess readmission rates, and the distances 
between their readmission rates and the quintile reference rate are 1%, 2%, and 3%, 
respectively.  The average readmission penalty for the three hospitals is 2%. In the 
following analysis the percent penalty reduction is assumed to be equal to the average 
excess readmission rate. 
The estimated penalty amounts are presented in Table 5.5 for all hospitals, 
teaching hospitals, and non-teaching hospitals using both the state-wide average and 
quintile-level average comparisons.  Using the state-wide comparison approach, a total of 
7 hospitals were penalized at an average estimated rate of 5.81%. Four teaching hospitals 
had an excess readmission rate of 4.61%, and three non-teaching hospitals had an average 
excess readmission rate of 7.41%. In contrast, the quintile-level comparison revealed 8 
hospitals would face penalty based on their average excess readmission rate of 4.69%. 
Furthermore, the quintile level comparison  produced  4 teaching hospitals with an 
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average penalty of 3.78%, based on an excess average readmission rate of 3.78%, and 4 
non-teaching hospitals had an average penalty of 5.61%.  
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Table 5.5: Mean reimbursement penalty as a percentage decrease of full reimbursement under existing average 
approach versus quintile level approach 
Existing Penalty Calculation Quintile Penalty Calculation Percent Change 
in Penalty 
Using Quintile 
Approach 
Estimated 
Penalty* 
No. Hospitals 
Penalized 
Estimated 
Penalty* 
No. Hospitals 
Penalized 
All Hospitals 5.81 ± 1.86 7 4.69 ± 2.40 8 -19.3
Teaching Hospitals 4.61 ± 0.55 4 3.78 ± 0.77 4 -18.0
Non-Teaching Hospitals 7.41 ± 1.79 3 5.61 ± 3.29 4 -24.3
*Estimated penalties are represented as mean ± standard deviation difference between hospital average and reference
group average (state-wide or quintile)
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The most important empirical result is the overall penalty is 19.3% less (4.69% 
versus 5.81%), with quintile averages than the state-wide average.  It is hypothesized that 
this reduction in penalty is correlated to the populations of poor (indigent and Medicaid) 
which are now, to at least some degree, controlled for through the quintile-level analysis.  
While not directly adjusting for socioeconomic status, the quintile-level approach 
represents a method that indirectly controls for the percentage of poor patients who have 
been shown to disproportionally be readmitted. 
Another finding likely a function of the South Carolina data and hence not 
representative of the nation as based on the literature, (Joynt and Jha 2013, Shimizu 2014, 
Muller 2013, Shahian 2012) is the estimated penalty reduction for non-teaching hospitals 
(24.3%) is greater than for  teaching hospitals (18.0%).  That is, relative to the national 
average approach, the quintile level approach provides greater penalty relief to non-
teaching hospitals than teaching hospitals in South Carolina. Despite this unexpected 
outcome, these results are consistent with the hypothesis that grouping hospitals into 
income quintiles based on the proportion of poor patients they serve would marginally 
reduce the reimbursement penalty.  It is important to note that these are aggregate 
measures and not direct comparisons of the two penalty estimates at the same hospital.  
That analysis is conducted later in this chapter.  
The important finding is that non-teaching hospitals have larger penalties than the 
non-profit teaching hospitals that arguably cannot turn patients away.  It is uncertain if 
this result is an anomaly of the South Carolina dataset.  Further analysis incorporating 
national level data would be needed to resolve that issue.  One possible explanation of 
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this anomaly might be that teaching hospitals are better equipped to handle the sickest of 
the sick which could offset the effect of the difference in share of low income patients 
between non-profit teaching hospitals and for-profit non-teaching hospitals.  
The results presented in Table 5.5 are based on the assumption that the average 
state-wide mean readmission rate and each quintile mean readmission rate are equal to 
the true but unknown respective population readmission rates.  However, the loss of 
independence created by calculating each hospital's readmission rate and aggregating 
those data for the 48 hospitals' to determine the comparative statewide and quintile level 
readmission rates must be controlled for.  The loss of independence here is that the 
weighted average state-wide readmission rate is comprised of each of the 48 hospital's 
data, to which the individual hospitals are compared for penalty determination. Thereby 
making the aggregate state-wide average dependent upon each hospital's readmission 
data. To address this issue, a series of 1,000 bootstrapped readmission rates were sampled 
with replacement for each of the 48 hospitals.  Aggregating each resampled readmission 
rate for all 48 hospitals resulted in 1,000 state-wide readmission rates for comparison.  
The bootstrapping process allows for the analysis of how often each hospital is 
determined to have excess readmission rates as a proportion of the 1,000 tested samples.  
Recalling from the empirical analysis, a hospital is deemed to have excess readmissions if 
the lower bound of the 95% confidence interval is entirely above the state-wide rate, or 
quintile level rate.  The bootstrapping process allows for analysis of the 48,000 
bootstrapped hospital samples to be compared to 1,000 state-wide averages, as well as 
5,000 quintile group averages (1,000 for each quintile) as a means of evaluating the 
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empirical analysis. The computer code for the bootstrap analysis is provided in Appendix 
D. 
Table 5.6 presents the bootstrapping results in a similar manor to Table 5.5.  
Similar trends emerge from the bootstrapped analysis. For all hospitals, the excess 
readmission penalty is less under the quintile approach than the state-wide average 
approach (5.83% versus 6.17%).  However, the percentage reduction is only 5.51% less 
using the bootstrap approach versus the 19.3% reduction in the non bootstrap estimation.  
The discrepancy noted between the two empirical approaches is likely due to the impact 
of using aggregate hospital  data to determine the state-wide average readmission rate, 
then comparing the individual hospital's readmission rate to that state-wide average. The 
bootstrap analysis also revealed similar reductions in the readmission penalty for both 
teaching and non-teaching hospitals.  Non-profit teaching hospitals have a 7.66% 
reduction in penalty amount, and the percent reduction for the for non-teaching hospitals 
is 8.83%.  The bootstrapped results confirm the readmission penalty decreases across all 
hospitals when the quintile average is used as the reference measure.  However, these 
average results do not reveal the full difference in penalty amounts between the two 
methods for each individual hospital.   
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Table 5.6: Mean reimbursement penalty as a percentage decrease of full reimbursement under existing average approach 
versus quintile approach based on 1,000 bootstrapped samples. 
Existing Penalty Calculation Quintile Penalty Calculation Percent Change in 
Penalty Using 
Quintile Approach 
Estimated 
Penalty* 
No. Hospitals 
Penalized ** 
Estimated 
Penalty* 
No. Hospitals 
Penalized ** 
All Hospitals 6.17 ± 2.43 18 5.83 ± 2.40 19 -5.51
Teaching Hospitals 4.83 ± 1.49 6 4.46 ± 1.40 7 -7.66
Non-Teaching Hospitals 7.93 ± 2.32 12 7.23 ± 3.02 12 -8.83
*Estimated penalties are represented as mean ± standard deviation difference between hospital average and reference
group average (state-wide or quintile)
** If any of the 1,000 samples resulted in a penalty for a particular hospital
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To further analyze the difference between the two methods, the difference in same 
hospital penalties were calculated. As before, the amount of penalty is proxied by the 
difference between a hospital's readmission rate and the state-wide (or quintile-level) 
comparison, only for hospitals deemed to have excess readmissions. Direct comparison 
of the difference in penalty value for the same hospital provides a more useful metric for 
assessing the difference in penalty structures.  If a hospital was not penalized under the 
original method but is subsequently penalized using the quintile-level comparison, the 
difference is the entirety of the new penalty.  Conversely, if a hospital is penalized using 
the state-wide comparison and is not penalized using the quintile-level comparison, the 
difference is the negative amount of the original penalty. 
Table 5.7 Difference in Amount of Penalty For State-Wide and 
Quintile-Level Comparisons 
Same Hospital Penalty Difference* 
Empirical Data Bootstrapped Data 
All Hospitals -0.38 -0.69
Teaching Hospitals -0.83 -1.12
Non-Teaching Hospitals 0.05 -0.22
*Amounts are represented as averages for respective groups, where
Penalty difference = (Quintile-level penalty) - (State-Wide penalty)
Table 5.7 reports the difference in penalty amount between the state-wide and 
quintile-level comparisons. For each hospital, both methods of calculating excess 
readmissions penalties were performed, then the difference between the quintile level 
method and state-wide method was calculated.  The resulting differences are presented in 
Table 5.7 where negative values indicate the quintile-level method resulted in lower 
penalties than the state-wide method, conceivably representing the differences in 
exogenous socioeconomic characteristics. This approach reduces noise created among 
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hospitals with very large or very small penalties by analyzing both methods of estimating 
excess readmission penalties for the same hospital.  Comparing the estimated penalties 
from the state-wide and quintile level methods is a useful metric to show differences at 
the same hospital. Similar trends are seen in both Table 5.6 and Table 5.7, where 
hospitals are penalized less under the quintile-level method relative to the state-wide 
method. Furthermore, a larger reduction is seen for teaching hospitals than non-teaching 
hospitals (1.12% versus 0.22%); a result empirically estimated and then confirmed 
through the bootstrapped analysis.  
In conclusion, analyzing excess readmissions relative to other hospitals with 
similar patient mix lessens the estimation bias caused by heterogeneous patient mixes in 
the current method used to calculate excess readmissions.  Calculating excess 
readmissions rates and penalties using a similar method to the one proposed by 
MEDPAC will not necessarily reduced the overall number of hospitals facing penalties. 
Instead it helps to focus the problem of readmissions back to the quality issues the HRRP 
is designed to address.  
Although the absolute reduction in excess readmissions penalties is not large, the 
percent reductions reveal the importance of considering patient socioeconomic 
characteristics when calculating excess readmission penalties.  These results do not 
directly imply that reductions in readmission rate penalties resulting from a MEDPAC 
type penalty structure will reduce cost shifting.  However, an overall reduction in excess 
readmissions for all hospitals will reduce financial penalties, which arguably could 
reduce the incentive hospitals have to shift cost.  Furthermore, these results highlight the 
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importance of "family" in the medical care market, as well as the importance of the 
prestige maximizing "charitable" member of the family, which are the nonprofit teaching 
hospitals. The "family" for medical care stands to benefit from a reduction in excess 
readmission rate penalties when socioeconomic factors are included in the penalty 
calculation.  
It is important to note that the estimated penalty reductions in this study are 
proxies for the true penalty algorithm used by CMS.  Another important consideration is 
that while the percentage improvement may seem small, once multiplied by the 
multimillion dollar Medicare reimbursements, their magnitude will reveal significant 
improvements in revenue streams among nonprofit teaching hospitals and the medical 
care market as a whole.  
Using an appropriate national data set including financial data tied to 
hospitalizations, the excess readmissions penalty associated with a poorer patient mix can 
more fairly be calculated.  Comparing these penalties under the current method (national 
comparison) and the new method (quintile/decile comparison) might reveal a reduction in 
the amount of penalty paid when compared to a cohort of hospitals with similar patient 
mix. The reduction in penalty could thereby reduce the potential need to shift cost to
private insurers. 
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION 
I. Introduction
Numerous studies have found that lower socioeconomic status contributes to the 
likelihood of readmission due to patients having less access to care, non-compliance to 
physician orders, and lower nutritional status, among many other reasons (Mueller et al. 
2013, and Shahian et al. 2012, Philbin et al 2001, Shimizu et al. 2014).  Joynt, Jha (2013) 
suggest that these differences are due in large part to patient socioeconomic factors and 
the greater proportion of medically complex cases larger teaching hospitals encounter 
relative to smaller non-teaching hospitals. Joynt and Jha also found that the level of 
Medicare reimbursement penalties is correlated with socioeconomic status.  This prior 
research support the hypothesis that socioeconomic status tends to be negatively 
correlated with increased medical complexity. Moreover, low income patients tend to be 
admitted and readmitted to nonprofit teaching and safety net hospitals in a higher 
proportion of all admissions relative to other hospital types (Philbin et al., 2001).   
This evidence, coupled with unique differences in optimization decisions between 
for-profit and nonprofit hospitals, sets the foundation to study excess readmissions 
penalties among two hospital types.  For-profit hospitals can be expected to maximize 
profits as a function of increasing patient quantities.  Nonprofit hospitals, however, are 
hypothesized to optimize prestige through maximizing revenues constrained by covering 
costs under a fixed operating margin subject to a unique mix of patients (Hirth, 1997; 
Horwtiz 2015; Rosenman et al., 2000).  The incorporation of a nonprofit hospital's 
93 
exogenously determined patient mix into optimization decisions requires these hospitals 
to offset potential losses from uncompensated care provided to poor and indigent patients 
by shifting costs to privately insured patients (Hadley and Feder, 1986; Dranove, 1988).  
A reinterpretation of Becker's 1974 essay "A Theory of Social Interactions" further 
supports the role of nonprofit hospitals in the market for medical care by positing that 
they can be viewed as acting as "charitable" family members.  Nonprofit hospitals as 
"charitable" family members seek to maximize prestige through redistributing increased 
revenue from the privately insured to cover the cost of uncompensated care to poor and 
uninsured patients. 
The unique nature of medical care markets, differences in hospital type and 
optimization decisions, and the knowledge that poor patients are readmitted in higher 
proportions to nonprofit teaching hospitals, prompted a review of the Hospital 
Readmission Reduction Program (HRRP). The current method of assessing excess 
readmissions penalties used by The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) 
does not account for differences in patient mix. Evidence provided here supports the 
notion that socioeconomic factors and unique patient mix among the distribution of for-
profit and nonprofit hospitals does impact readmission rates and resulting excess 
readmissions penalties.  
The objectives of this research were to demonstrate the differences among 
hospital readmission rates and resulting penalties by hospital type and socioeconomic 
factors to demonstrate how the current Hospital Readmission Reduction program 
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disproportionately penalizes nonprofit teaching hospitals for excess readmissions as a 
result of their exogenous patient mix. 
II. Conclusions
To satisfy the research objective, a longitudinal data set of South Carolina 
inpatient hospital visits from January 1, 2007 through December 31, 2011 was used to 
document differences between for-profit hospitals and nonprofit teaching hospitals.  The 
data were used to demonstrate the differences between the current method of calculating 
excess readmission rates and the new method proposed by the Medicare Payment 
Advisory Commission (MEDPAC, 2013) that groups hospitals based on the proportion of 
poor patients they serve.  
Differences in patient mix between South Carolina for-profit and nonprofit 
teaching hospitals proxied by the percentage of Medicaid and indigent patients cared for 
by each hospital type were documented in Chapter IV. Non-profits were shown to have a 
greater percentage of indigent and Medicaid patients.  This finding supports the growing 
body of literature that argues the unique mix of patients between hospital types requires 
different optimization decisions between for-profit and nonprofit hospitals. Moreover, 
comparing excess readmission penalties under the current program (CMS, HRRP) and 
the method proposed by MEDPAC suggests that incorporating patient mix into the excess 
readmission penalty will reduce readmission penalties and increase hospital revenue.  
Moreover, a reduction in excess readmission penalties would theoretically reduce the 
incentive to shift costs from those unable to pay to patients with the ability to pay.  A 
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secondary benefit of the proposed excess readmission penalty calculation is that it will 
more fairly assess the quality of hospital care. 
As reported in Chapter V, both empirically and through the bootstrap simulations, 
adjusting a hospital's readmission rate to control for the proportion of poor patients 
reduces the level of excess readmission penalty.  Furthermore, the socioeconomic 
adjustment benefits nonprofit teaching hospitals to a greater degree. The same hospital 
penalty reduction was 1.12% for nonprofit teaching hospitals and 0.22% for for profit 
non-teaching hospitals in the bootstrap analysis. The resulting difference between 
nonprofit and for-profit penalties provide support to the hypothesis that nonprofit 
hospitals serve as "charitable" members of the healthcare family by caring for the poorest 
members of society who are often the sickest.   
III. Discussion
While these results are limited by a lack of more detailed data on patient 
characteristics, they provide support that socioeconomic status is an integral aspect of 
determining excess hospital readmissions.  The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services (CMS), and the Yale New Haven Health Services Corporation (YNHHSC) 
make strong cases for not including socioeconomic status as a risk-adjustment factor 
when determining readmissions rates. These groups argue it is inappropriate to adjust for 
patient characteristics because all patients deserve the same quality of care regardless of 
socioeconomic status. While it is necessary and important to maintain quality standards 
in the medical care market, arguably, it is equally as important to note the differences in 
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patient characteristics and patient mix between hospital types impact the excess 
readmission rate.   
Current literature provides support for these findings, and the importance of 
modifying the excess readmission penalty to control for hospital patient mix. Barnett et 
al. (2015) used Health and Retirement Study surveys with linked Medicare claims from 
2009 to 2012 and identified 29 patient characteristics outside of the standard risk 
adjustments used by Medicare to assess the extent to which these additional patient 
variables impact readmission rates.  Of the 29 characteristics identified, 22 predicted 
readmission (Barnett 2015).  Thus, there is a growing body of research that suggests 
patient specific factors contribute to the likelihood of readmission that are not currently 
incorporated into excess readmission calculations by CMS.  Barnett et al. conclude 
"Hospitals with high readmission rates may be penalized to a large 
extent based on the patients they serve (page E1)." 
The results of Barnett et al. suggest that hospital readmission is less likely to be explained 
by the quality of care provided to a patient, and more likely to be explained by the 
attributes of the patient.  Fundamentals of medical care and the structure of the United 
States Healthcare system does not allow for most hospitals to control the patient 
populations they serve.  Yet hospitals continue to be penalized for readmissions 
exogenous factors largely outside their control.  
Recently, Zuckerman et al. addressed the issue of maintaining quality care in the 
presence of excess readmissions penalties (2016).  They discuss the claim that some 
hospitals may circumvent possible readmission penalties by placing patients who return 
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to the hospital within 30-days of a previous admission in "observational units" rather than 
readmitting the patient.  The claim posits that some hospitals may use administrative and 
coding techniques to avoid penalties of having the patient readmitted.  They analyzed 
3,387 hospitals between 2007 and 2015 and found that changes in observational-unit 
stays did not account for decreases in readmissions (Zuckerman et al., 2016). This finding 
suggests that even though hospitals may attempt to to inappropriately circumvent 
penalties, such actions have not been successful at the individual hospital level. 
Sheingold et al. (2016) address the issue of differences in readmissions penalties 
between nonprofit safety-net hospitals and other hospitals.  They found that patient 
socioeconomic factors partly explain readmission rate differences, and safety-net 
hospitals have slightly higher readmission rates than other hospital types.  The authors 
further conclude that their findings, among others currently in the literature, support the 
need for consideration of policy alternatives for excess readmission rate and penalty 
calculations (Sheingold et al., 2016). 
The debate and discussion of policy changes to the Hospital Readmission 
Reduction program is continuously evolving.  The current findings of Barnett et al., 
Zuckerman et al., and Sheingold et al., provide evidence and support that excess 
readmission penalty determination needs to incorporate patient level factors and hospital 
type considerations. The importance of these findings may result in policies that more 
accurately identify underperforming hospitals after controlling for patient mix. 
Furthermore, the resulting policy changes stand to improve the entire healthcare "family" 
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by incorporating measures that highlight the need for the "charitable" nonprofit hospital 
in conjunction with for-profit hospitals to best treat populations in need of medical care. 
IV. Study Limitations
The Hospital Readmission Reduction Program (HRRP) is a program directly 
attributed to the Medicare population.  However, the data used contain a sample of South 
Carolina inpatient hospitalizations reported for patients of all ages, not just Medicare 
patients.  While the data used contained some Medicare patients, it does not contain all 
inpatient hospitalizations for Medicare patients in the state.  Therefore, the entire data set 
of all adult hospital claims was used because selecting only the Medicare population 
would have resulted in an insufficiently small dataset given the HRRP 
inclusion/exclusion criteria.  Additionally, the collected dataset only included patients 
with index admissions for acute heart attacks (AMI), heart failure and pneumonia.  
Therefore, determination of the proportion of poor patients at each hospital and the 
resulting quintiles used for analysis is incomplete. To more accurately conduct this study 
all hospital admissions for any patient in the state during the study period are needed.  
Furthermore, HRRP analyzes excess readmission rates using a rolling three-year 
average.  Due to insufficient data to satisfy the requirements of The Centers for Medicare 
and Medicaid guidelines for calculating readmissions, a 5 year data series was used. 
Another limitation is the lack of risk adjusting, due to inadequate risk adjustment 
variables. A statewide database provides a unique and interesting perspective for 
conducting a study of excess readmissions calculations.  However, a nationally 
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representative, risk adjusted database of Medicare patients would best be able to 
determine the impact of proposed policy changes. The study is also limited due to the 
small sample size of teaching and non-teaching hospitals.  Comparing 8 teaching 
hospitals to 40 non-teaching hospitals makes the results less robust than a national study.  
A comprehensive dataset that aggregated all United States teaching and non-teaching 
hospitals would provide the best data for this analysis.  
Additional limitations include the inability to quantify the degree of nonprofit 
hospital prestige maximization.  The notion of prestige maximization is discussed in the 
literature, but consensus on how to best quantify the theoretically ambiguous concept of 
prestige has never been reached.  With appropriate data, profit maximization among for-
profit hospitals could be determined.  Further research is required to understand the 
interactions and optimization of nonprofit prestige maximizing hospitals and profit 
maximizing hospitals within the medical care "family". 
The results presented here, in conjunction with current and future research 
provide some evidence for the need to improve the calculation of the excess readmission 
rate and penalty determinations through policy changes that incorporate patient level 
factors and hospital type.  Changes to the Hospital Readmission Reduction Program as a 
result of this continued research stands to more fairly penalize hospitals while 
maintaining high quality standards of care.  
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APPENDICES 
Appendix A 
R Code for Variable Creation 
#Index 
AMImr<-read.csv("AMImr.csv",sep=",", header=TRUE) 
AMImr$ADMD=as.Date(AMImr$ADMD,"%m/%d/%Y" ) 
AMImr$DISD=as.Date(AMImr$DISD,"%m/%d/%Y" ) 
AMISORT<-AMImr[order(AMImr$ID, AMImr$ADMD, AMImr$ADHOUR),] 
N = nrow(AMISORT) 
#AMISORT$RA = rep(NA, N) 
AMISORT$Index = rep(NA, N) 
#AMISORT$Transfer= rep(NA, N) 
for(i in 2:N){ 
  if(AMISORT$AMI[i]==1 ){ 
    AMISORT$Index[i] = 1 
  } 
  else if (AMISORT$ID[i] == AMISORT$ID[i-1]  && 
AMISORT$ADMD[i]==AMISORT$ADMD[i-1] ){ 
    AMISORT$Index[i] = 0  
 } 
  else { 
    AMISORT$Index[i] = 0  
  } 
}   
write.csv(AMISORT, file="AMImrI.csv") 
#Transfer 
AMImrI<-read.csv("AMImrI.csv",sep=",", header=TRUE) 
AMImrI$ADMD=as.Date(AMImrI$ADMD,"%m/%d/%Y" ) 
AMImrI$DISD=as.Date(AMImrI$DISD,"%m/%d/%Y" ) 
AMISORT<-AMImrI[order(AMImrI$ID, AMImrI$ADMD, AMImrI$ADHOUR),] 
N = nrow(AMISORT) 
#AMISORT$RA = rep(NA, N) 
#AMISORT$Index = rep(NA, N) 
AMISORT$Transfer= rep(NA, N) 
for(i in 3:N){ 
  if(AMISORT$ID[i] == AMISORT$ID[i-1]  && AMISORT$ADMD[i] - 
AMISORT$DISD[i-1]<=1 && AMISORT$Index[i-1]==1 && AMISORT$HID[i] 
!=AMISORT$HID[i-1]){ 
    AMISORT$Transfer[i] = 1 
101 
  } 
  else if (AMISORT$ID[i] == AMISORT$ID[i-1]  && AMISORT$ADMD[i] - 
AMISORT$DISD[i-2]<=1 && AMISORT$Index[i-2]==1 && AMISORT$HID[i] 
!=AMISORT$HID[i-1]){ 
    AMISORT$Transfer[i] = 1  
  } 
  else { 
    AMISORT$Transfer[i] = 0  
  } 
}   
write.csv(AMISORT, file="AMImrIT.csv", row.names=FALSE) 
#RAi- Index readmission 
AMImrIT<-read.csv("AMImrIT.csv",sep=",", header=TRUE) 
AMImrIT$ADMD=as.Date(AMImrIT$ADMD,"%m/%d/%Y" ) 
AMImrIT$DISD=as.Date(AMImrIT$DISD,"%m/%d/%Y" ) 
AMISORT<-AMImrIT[order(AMImrIT$ID, AMImrIT$ADMD, AMImrIT$ADHOUR),] 
N = nrow(AMISORT) 
AMISORT$RAi = rep(NA, N) 
#AMISORT$RAr = rep(NA, N) 
#AMISORT$Index = rep(NA, N) 
#AMISORT$Transfer= rep(NA, N) 
for(i in 3:N){ 
  if(AMISORT$ID[i] == AMISORT$ID[i-1]  && AMISORT$AMI[i-1]==1 && 
AMISORT$Transfer[i]!=1){ 
    AMISORT$RAi[i-1] = 1 
  } 
  else if(AMISORT$ID[i] == AMISORT$ID[i-2]  && AMISORT$AMI[i-2]==1 ){ 
    AMISORT$RAi[i-2] = 1  
  } 
  else { 
    AMISORT$RAi[i] = 0  
  } 
}   
write.csv(AMISORT, file="AMImrITRi.csv", row.names=FALSE) 
#RAi30 
AMImrTIRir<-read.csv("AMImrTIRir.csv",sep=",", header=TRUE) 
AMImrTIRir$ADMD=as.Date(AMImrTIRir$ADMD,"%m/%d/%Y" ) 
AMImrTIRir$DISD=as.Date(AMImrTIRir$DISD,"%m/%d/%Y" ) 
AMISORT<-AMImrTIRir[order(AMImrTIRir$ID, AMImrTIRir$ADMD, 
AMImrTIRir$ADHOUR),] 
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N = nrow(AMISORT) 
AMISORT$RAi30 = rep(NA, N) 
#AMISORT$RAr = rep(NA, N) 
#AMISORT$Index = rep(NA, N) 
#AMISORT$Transfer= rep(NA, N) 
for(i in 3:N){ 
  if(AMISORT$ADMD[i] - AMISORT$DISD[i-1]<= 30 && AMISORT$ID[i] == 
AMISORT$ID[i-1] &&  AMISORT$Index[i-1]==1 && AMISORT$Transfer[i]!=1){ 
    AMISORT$RAi30[i-1] = 1 
  } 
  else if(AMISORT$ADMD[i]-AMISORT$DISD[i-2]<=30 && AMISORT$ID[i] == 
AMISORT$ID[i-2]  && AMISORT$Index[i-2]==1 && AMISORT$RAi[i-1]!= 1){ 
    AMISORT$RAi30[i-2] = 1  
  } 
  else { 
    AMISORT$RAi30[i] = NA  
  } 
}   
write.csv(AMISORT, file="AMImrITRi30.csv", row.names=FALSE)  
#RAi30t 
AMImrTIRir3030<-read.csv("AMImrTIRir3030.csv",sep=",", header=TRUE) 
AMImrTIRir3030$ADMD=as.Date(AMImrTIRir3030$ADMD,"%m/%d/%Y" ) 
AMImrTIRir3030$DISD=as.Date(AMImrTIRir3030$DISD,"%m/%d/%Y" ) 
AMISORT<-AMImrTIRir3030[order(AMImrTIRir3030$ID, AMImrTIRir3030$ADMD, 
AMImrTIRir3030$ADHOUR),] 
N = nrow(AMISORT) 
AMISORT$RAi30t = rep(NA, N) 
#AMISORT$RAr = rep(NA, N) 
#AMISORT$Index = rep(NA, N) 
#AMISORT$Transfer= rep(NA, N) 
for(i in 3:N){ 
  if(AMISORT$ADMD[i] - AMISORT$DISD[i-1]<= 30 && AMISORT$ID[i] == 
AMISORT$ID[i-1] &&  AMISORT$Index[i-1]==1 && AMISORT$Transfer[i]!=1){ 
    AMISORT$RAi30t[i-1] = (AMISORT$ADMD[i] - AMISORT$DISD[i-1]) 
  } 
  else if(AMISORT$ADMD[i]-AMISORT$DISD[i-2]<=30 && AMISORT$ID[i] == 
AMISORT$ID[i-2]  && AMISORT$Index[i-2]==1 && AMISORT$RAi[i-1]!= 1){ 
    AMISORT$RAi30t[i-2] = (AMISORT$ADMD[i] - AMISORT$DISD[i-2])  
  } 
  else { 
    AMISORT$RAi30t[i] = NA  
  } 
}   
write.csv(AMISORT, file="AMImrITRi3030t.csv", row.names=FALSE) 
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Appendix B 
R-Code for Hospital Exclusion
AMI<-read.csv("AMImrITRi3030t.csv",sep=",", header=TRUE) 
AMI$ADMD=as.Date(AMI$ADMD,"%m/%d/%Y") 
AMI$DISD=as.Date(AMI$DISD,"%m/%d/%Y") 
AMIsort<-AMI[order(AMI$ID, AMI$DISD),] 
AMI07<-AMIsort[which(AMIsort$DISD<'2008-01-01'),] 
AMI08<-AMIsort[which(AMIsort$DISD>'2007-12-31' & AMIsort$DISD<'2009-01-
01'),] 
AMI09<-AMIsort[which(AMIsort$DISD>'2008-12-31' & AMIsort$DISD<'2010-01-
01'),] 
AMI10<-AMIsort[which(AMIsort$DISD>'2009-12-31' & AMIsort$DISD<'2011-01-
01'),] 
AMI11<-AMIsort[which(AMIsort$DISD>='2011-01-01'),] 
table(AMI07$Index, AMI07$HID) 
AMI$AMI07q<-0 
AMI$AMI07q[which(AMI$HID==50)]=1 
AMI$AMI07q[which(AMI$HID==105)]=1 
AMI$AMI07q[which(AMI$HID==155)]=1 
AMI$AMI07q[which(AMI$HID==220)]=1 
AMI$AMI07q[which(AMI$HID==280)]=1 
AMI$AMI07q[which(AMI$HID==310)]=1 
AMI$AMI07q[which(AMI$HID==340)]=1 
AMI$AMI07q[which(AMI$HID==347)]=1 
AMI$AMI07q[which(AMI$HID==390)]=1 
AMI$AMI07q[which(AMI$HID==420)]=1 
AMI$AMI07q[which(AMI$HID==430)]=1 
AMI$AMI07q[which(AMI$HID==450)]=1 
AMI$AMI07q[which(AMI$HID==460)]=1 
AMI$AMI07q[which(AMI$HID==490)]=1 
AMI$AMI07q[which(AMI$HID==540)]=1 
AMI$AMI07q[which(AMI$HID==565)]=1 
AMI$AMI07q[which(AMI$HID==570)]=1 
AMI$AMI07q[which(AMI$HID==575)]=1 
AMI$AMI07q[which(AMI$HID==580)]=1 
AMI$AMI07q[which(AMI$HID==590)]=1 
AMI$AMI07q[which(AMI$HID==610)]=1 
AMI$AMI07q[which(AMI$HID==630)]=1 
AMI$AMI07q[which(AMI$HID==640)]=1 
AMI$AMI07q[which(AMI$HID==645)]=1 
AMI$AMI07q[which(AMI$HID==650)]=1 
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table(AMI08$Index, AMI08$HID) 
AMI$AMI08q<-0 
AMI$AMI08q[which(AMI$HID==50)]=1 
AMI$AMI08q[which(AMI$HID==105)]=1 
AMI$AMI08q[which(AMI$HID==155)]=1 
AMI$AMI08q[which(AMI$HID==220)]=1 
AMI$AMI08q[which(AMI$HID==280)]=1 
AMI$AMI08q[which(AMI$HID==310)]=1 
AMI$AMI08q[which(AMI$HID==340)]=1 
AMI$AMI08q[which(AMI$HID==347)]=1 
AMI$AMI08q[which(AMI$HID==390)]=1 
AMI$AMI08q[which(AMI$HID==420)]=1 
AMI$AMI08q[which(AMI$HID==430)]=1 
AMI$AMI08q[which(AMI$HID==450)]=1 
AMI$AMI08q[which(AMI$HID==460)]=1 
AMI$AMI08q[which(AMI$HID==490)]=1 
AMI$AMI08q[which(AMI$HID==540)]=1 
AMI$AMI08q[which(AMI$HID==565)]=1 
AMI$AMI08q[which(AMI$HID==570)]=1 
AMI$AMI08q[which(AMI$HID==575)]=1 
AMI$AMI08q[which(AMI$HID==580)]=1 
AMI$AMI08q[which(AMI$HID==590)]=1 
AMI$AMI08q[which(AMI$HID==610)]=1 
AMI$AMI08q[which(AMI$HID==630)]=1 
AMI$AMI08q[which(AMI$HID==640)]=1 
AMI$AMI08q[which(AMI$HID==645)]=1 
AMI$AMI08q[which(AMI$HID==650)]=1 
table(AMI09$Index, AMI09$HID) 
AMI$AMI09q<-0 
AMI$AMI09q[which(AMI$HID==50)]=1 
AMI$AMI09q[which(AMI$HID==105)]=1 
AMI$AMI09q[which(AMI$HID==120)]=1 
AMI$AMI09q[which(AMI$HID==155)]=1 
AMI$AMI09q[which(AMI$HID==220)]=1 
AMI$AMI09q[which(AMI$HID==280)]=1 
AMI$AMI09q[which(AMI$HID==340)]=1 
AMI$AMI09q[which(AMI$HID==345)]=1 
AMI$AMI09q[which(AMI$HID==347)]=1 
AMI$AMI09q[which(AMI$HID==420)]=1 
AMI$AMI09q[which(AMI$HID==430)]=1 
AMI$AMI09q[which(AMI$HID==450)]=1 
AMI$AMI09q[which(AMI$HID==460)]=1 
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AMI$AMI09q[which(AMI$HID==490)]=1 
AMI$AMI09q[which(AMI$HID==540)]=1 
AMI$AMI09q[which(AMI$HID==565)]=1 
AMI$AMI09q[which(AMI$HID==570)]=1 
AMI$AMI09q[which(AMI$HID==575)]=1 
AMI$AMI09q[which(AMI$HID==580)]=1 
AMI$AMI09q[which(AMI$HID==590)]=1 
AMI$AMI09q[which(AMI$HID==600)]=1 
AMI$AMI09q[which(AMI$HID==610)]=1 
AMI$AMI09q[which(AMI$HID==630)]=1 
AMI$AMI09q[which(AMI$HID==640)]=1 
AMI$AMI09q[which(AMI$HID==645)]=1 
AMI$AMI09q[which(AMI$HID==650)]=1 
AMI$AMI09q[which(AMI$HID==651)]=1 
table(AMI10$Index, AMI10$HID) 
AMI$AMI10q<-0 
AMI$AMI10q[which(AMI$HID==50)]=1 
AMI$AMI10q[which(AMI$HID==105)]=1 
AMI$AMI10q[which(AMI$HID==155)]=1 
AMI$AMI10q[which(AMI$HID==220)]=1 
AMI$AMI10q[which(AMI$HID==280)]=1 
AMI$AMI10q[which(AMI$HID==310)]=1 
AMI$AMI10q[which(AMI$HID==340)]=1 
AMI$AMI10q[which(AMI$HID==345)]=1 
AMI$AMI10q[which(AMI$HID==347)]=1 
AMI$AMI10q[which(AMI$HID==420)]=1 
AMI$AMI10q[which(AMI$HID==430)]=1 
AMI$AMI10q[which(AMI$HID==450)]=1 
AMI$AMI10q[which(AMI$HID==460)]=1 
AMI$AMI10q[which(AMI$HID==490)]=1 
AMI$AMI10q[which(AMI$HID==540)]=1 
AMI$AMI10q[which(AMI$HID==565)]=1 
AMI$AMI10q[which(AMI$HID==570)]=1 
AMI$AMI10q[which(AMI$HID==575)]=1 
AMI$AMI10q[which(AMI$HID==580)]=1 
AMI$AMI10q[which(AMI$HID==590)]=1 
AMI$AMI10q[which(AMI$HID==610)]=1 
AMI$AMI10q[which(AMI$HID==630)]=1 
AMI$AMI10q[which(AMI$HID==640)]=1 
AMI$AMI10q[which(AMI$HID==645)]=1 
AMI$AMI10q[which(AMI$HID==650)]=1 
AMI$AMI10q[which(AMI$HID==668)]=1 
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table(AMI11$Index, AMI11$HID) 
AMI$AMI11q<-0 
AMI$AMI11q[which(AMI$HID==50)]=1 
AMI$AMI11q[which(AMI$HID==105)]=1 
AMI$AMI11q[which(AMI$HID==120)]=1 
AMI$AMI11q[which(AMI$HID==140)]=1 
AMI$AMI11q[which(AMI$HID==155)]=1 
AMI$AMI11q[which(AMI$HID==220)]=1 
AMI$AMI11q[which(AMI$HID==280)]=1 
AMI$AMI11q[which(AMI$HID==310)]=1 
AMI$AMI11q[which(AMI$HID==340)]=1 
AMI$AMI11q[which(AMI$HID==345)]=1 
AMI$AMI11q[which(AMI$HID==347)]=1 
AMI$AMI11q[which(AMI$HID==370)]=1 
AMI$AMI11q[which(AMI$HID==390)]=1 
AMI$AMI11q[which(AMI$HID==420)]=1 
AMI$AMI11q[which(AMI$HID==430)]=1 
AMI$AMI11q[which(AMI$HID==450)]=1 
AMI$AMI11q[which(AMI$HID==460)]=1 
AMI$AMI11q[which(AMI$HID==490)]=1 
AMI$AMI11q[which(AMI$HID==540)]=1 
AMI$AMI11q[which(AMI$HID==565)]=1 
AMI$AMI11q[which(AMI$HID==570)]=1 
AMI$AMI11q[which(AMI$HID==575)]=1 
AMI$AMI11q[which(AMI$HID==580)]=1 
AMI$AMI11q[which(AMI$HID==590)]=1 
AMI$AMI11q[which(AMI$HID==600)]=1 
AMI$AMI11q[which(AMI$HID==610)]=1 
AMI$AMI11q[which(AMI$HID==630)]=1 
AMI$AMI11q[which(AMI$HID==640)]=1 
AMI$AMI11q[which(AMI$HID==645)]=1 
AMI$AMI11q[which(AMI$HID==650)]=1 
AMI$AMI11q[which(AMI$HID==668)]=1 
write.csv(AMI, file="AMIq.csv", row.names=FALSE) 
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Appendix C 
Data Variables and Descriptions 
Variable Name 
(for non-ASC11) 
Data 
Element 
Type Length Values Comments 
ADHOUR Admission Hour Num 3 00   12:00 - 12:59 Midnight 
01   01:00 - 01:59 AM 
02   02:00 - 02:59 AM 
03   03:00 - 03:59 AM 
04   04:00 - 04:59 AM 
05   05:00 - 05:59 AM 
06   06:00 - 06:59 AM 
07   07:00 - 07:59 AM 
08   08:00 - 08:59 AM 
09   09:00 - 09:59 AM 
10   10:00 - 10:59 AM 
11   11:00 - 11:59 AM 
12   12:00 - 12:59 Noon 
13   01:00 - 01:59 PM 
14   02:00 - 02:59 PM 
15   03:00 - 03:59 PM 
16   04:00 - 04:59 PM 
17   05:00 - 05:59 PM 
18   06:00 - 06:59 PM 
19   07:00 - 07:59 PM 
20   08:00 - 08:59 PM 
21   09:00 - 09:59 PM 
22   10:00 - 10:59 PM 
The hour is in 
military format. 
For Quarter 4 2006 
data, the ADHOUR 
variable is missing 
from approximately 
3% of the records. 
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Variable Name 
(for non-ASC11) 
Data 
Element 
Type Length Values Comments 
23   11:00 - 11:59 PM 
99   Hour Unknown 
ADMD Admission Date Num 8 SAS Date For observation 
cases, the date the 
patient is actually 
admitted is the 
admission date. 
ADMDAY Admission Day of 
the week 
Num 8 1 Sunday 
2 Monday 
3 Tuesday 
4 Wednesday 
5 Thursday 
6 Friday 
7 Saturday 
ADMMTH Admission Month 
of the Year 
Num 8 
ADMS Admission Source Char 1 1 Physician Referral 
2 Clinic Referral 
3 HMO Referral 
4 Transfer from Hospital 
5 Transfer from Skilled Nursing 
Facility 
6 Transfer from Another Health  
Care Facility 
7 Emergency Room 
8 Court/Law Enforcement 
9 Info Not Available 
A Transfer from Critical Access 
Hospital 
B        Transfer from a HHA 
If determining a 
person admitted 
through the ED, use 
CHG450 greater than 
zero. 
When ADM_TYPE 
equals ‘4’, use the 
Newborn Coding 
Structure. 
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Variable Name 
(for non-ASC11) 
Data 
Element 
Type Length Values Comments 
C        Readmit to same HHA 
D 
     Transfer from Hospital Inpatient 
        in the Same Facility 
E 
        Transfer from Ambulatory 
        Surgery Center 
F         Transfer from a hospice facility 
Newborn Coding Structure: 
1 Normal Delivery 
2 Premature Delivery 
3 Sick Baby 
4 Extramural Birth 
5 Born in this Hospital 
6 Born outside this Hospital 
ADMYEAR Admission Year Num 8 
ADM_DIAG Admission 
Diagnosis 
Char 6 ICD-9 
ADM_TYPE Admission Type Char 1 1 Emergency 
2 Urgent 
3 Elective 
4 Newborn 
5 Trauma Center Activation 
6 –  8    Reserved National Assignment 
9 N/A 
AGE Patient Age Num 5 Integer Age at date of 
discharge.  
AGRP Patient Age Group Num 3 1 Age less than 1 
2 Age 01-04 
3 Age 05-09 
Patient Age Group 
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Variable Name 
(for non-ASC11) 
Data 
Element 
Type Length Values Comments 
4 Age 10-14 
5 Age 15-19 
6 Age 20-24 
7 Age 25-29 
8 Age 30-34 
9 Age 35-39 
10 Age 40-44 
11 Age 45-49 
12 Age 50-54 
13 Age 55-59 
14 Age 60-64 
15 Age 65-69 
16 Age 70-74 
17 Age 75-79 
18 Age 80-84 
19 Age 85+ 
DISD Discharge Date Num 8 SAS Date 
DISDAY Discharge Day of 
the week 
Num 8 1 Sunday 
2 Monday 
3 Tuesday 
4 Wednesday 
5 Thursday 
6 Friday 
7 Saturday 
DISDHR Discharge Hour Num 3 00   12:00 - 12:59 Midnight 
01   01:00 - 01:59 AM 
02   02:00 - 02:59 AM 
03   03:00 - 03:59 AM 
04   04:00 - 04:59 AM 
05   05:00 - 05:59 AM 
The hour is in 
military format. 
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Variable Name 
(for non-ASC11) 
Data 
Element 
Type Length Values Comments 
06   06:00 - 06:59 AM 
07   07:00 - 07:59 AM 
08   08:00 - 08:59 AM 
09   09:00 - 09:59 AM 
10   10:00 - 10:59 AM 
11   11:00 - 11:59 AM 
12   12:00 - 12:59 Noon 
13   01:00 - 01:59 PM 
14   02:00 - 02:59 PM 
15   03:00 - 03:59 PM 
16   04:00 - 04:59 PM 
17   05:00 - 05:59 PM 
18   06:00 - 06:59 PM 
19   07:00 - 07:59 PM 
20   08:00 - 08:59 PM 
21   09:00 - 09:59 PM 
22   10:00 - 10:59 PM 
23   11:00 - 11:59 PM 
99   Hour Unknown 
DISMTH Discharge Month 
of the Year 
Num 8 
DISYEAR Discharge Year Num 8 
DISP Discharge Status Num 3 Appendix P 
DOB Patient Date Of 
Birth 
Num 8 SAS Date 
DRG4 Diagnosis Related 
Group 
Num 4 CMS-DRG Version 24 100% of Inpatient 
Records are coded. 
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Variable Name 
(for non-ASC11) 
Data 
Element 
Type Length Values Comments 
ER Emergency Room 
Flag 
Num 3 .=Inpatient    1=Emergency Room Visit 
HID Hospital ID Num 5 Appendix A:  Hospital ID Table 
ID Ors Assigned 
Tracking # 
Num 8 Encrypted Individual Tracking # 
LBEDGRP Bed Size based on 
Licensed Beds 
Char 1 1         < 100 
2        101-299 
3        300+ 
LOSD1 Length Of Stay Num 5 Integer Number of Days 
MDC Major Diagnostic 
Category 
Num 8 Valid Code Range:  1 – 25.  Appendix I:  
Major Diagnostic Categories. 
MED_NO Medical Record 
Number 
Char 17 
MSDRG MS-DRG Num 8 Starts October 2007 w/ Version 25 
OP Outpatient 
Surgery Flag 
Num 3 Only when imaging 
and outpatient 
surgery are in same 
file. 
PAT_NO Patient Number Char 20 Facility-assigned 
patient identifier 
PAYOR1 Primary Payor Num 3 Appendix L:  Payor Code Table 
PCODE Surgery coding 
methodology 
Num 8 1=ICD-9, 2=ICD-10 
PDATE Primary Day of 
Surgery 
Num 1 In relation to 
admission date 
PDIAG Primary Diagnosis Char 6 001 – 999  ; V01 – V829  
Refer to the ICD-9-CM Coding Manual. 
PECODE Cause Of Injury 
Code 
Char 6 E800 – E869 and E877 – E999 
Refer to the ICD-9-CM Coding Manual, 
Supplementary Classification of Injury 
and Poisoning. 
An E-code is required 
when the primary 
diagnosis is an injury 
(Dx 800 – 959). 
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Variable Name 
(for non-ASC11) 
Data 
Element 
Type Length Values Comments 
PPOA Primary Present 
on Admission 
Char 1 Y=Yes, N=No, U=No Information, 
W=Clinically Undetermined 
1,E,(Blank)=Exempt 
PPROC Primary Procedure Char 7 01 - 9999 
Refer to the ICD-9-CM Coding Manual, 
Procedure Tabular. 
Approximately 40% 
of the records do not 
have a primary 
procedure. 
PPROCD Primary Procedure  
Date  
Num 8 SAS date 
RACE Patient Race Num 3 . Missing 
1 White 
2 African-American 
3 Asian 
4 American Indian 
5 Other 
6 Hispanic 
SDATE1-
SDATE12 
Secondary Day of 
Surgery 
Num 3 Day in relation to 
admission date. 
SDIAG1 1st Secondary 
Diagnosis 
Char 6 001 – 999  ; V01 – V829  
Refer to the ICD-9-CM Coding Manual. 
SDIAG2 2nd Secondary 
Diagnosis 
Char 6 001 – 999  ; V01 – V829  
Refer to the ICD-9-CM Coding Manual. 
SDIAG3 3rd Secondary 
Diagnosis 
Char 6 001 – 999  ; V01 – V829  
Refer to the ICD-9-CM Coding Manual. 
SDIAG4 4th Secondary 
Diagnosis 
Char 6 001 – 999  ; V01 – V829  
Refer to the ICD-9-CM Coding Manual. 
SDIAG5 5th Secondary 
Diagnosis 
Char 6 001 – 999  ; V01 – V829  
Refer to the ICD-9-CM Coding Manual. 
SDIAG6 6th Secondary Char 6 001 – 999  ; V01 – V829 
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Variable Name 
(for non-ASC11) 
Data 
Element 
Type Length Values Comments 
Diagnosis Refer to the ICD-9-CM Coding Manual. 
SDIAG7 7th Secondary 
Diagnosis 
Char 6 001 – 999  ; V01 – V829  
Refer to the ICD-9-CM Coding Manual. 
SDIAG8 8th Secondary 
Diagnosis 
Char 6 001 – 999  ; V01 – V829  
Refer to the ICD-9-CM Coding Manual. 
SDIAG9 9th Secondary 
Diagnosis 
Char 6 001 – 999  ; V01 – V829  
Refer to the ICD-9-CM Coding Manual. 
SDIAG10 10th Secondary 
Diagnosis 
Char 6 001 – 999  ; V01 – V829  
Refer to the ICD-9-CM Coding Manual. 
SDIAG11 11th Secondary 
Diagnosis 
Char 6 001 – 999  ; V01 – V829  
Refer to the ICD-9-CM Coding Manual. 
SDIAG12 12th Secondary 
Diagnosis 
Char 6 001 – 999  ; V01 – V829  
Refer to the ICD-9-CM Coding Manual. 
SDIAG13 13th Secondary 
Diagnosis 
Char 6 001 – 999  ; V01 – V829  
Refer to the ICD-9-CM Coding Manual. 
SDIAG14 14th Secondary 
Diagnosis 
Char 6 001 – 999  ; V01 – V829  
Refer to the ICD-9-CM Coding Manual. 
SECODE Place Of 
Occurrence Injury 
Code 
Char 6 E8490 Home 
E8491 Farm 
E8492 Mine/Quarry 
E8493 Industrial Place and Premises 
E8494 Place for Recreation and Sport 
E8495 Street and Highway 
E8496 Public Building 
E8497 Residential Institution 
E8498 Other Specified Places 
Place of Occurrence 
Code is not required 
for all E-Codes. 
SEX Gender Of Patient Char 1 M = Male 
F = Female 
U = Unknown 
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Variable Name  
(for non-ASC11) 
Data 
Element 
Type Length Values Comments 
SPC1 1st Physician 
Specialty 
Char 3 Appendix C.1:  Physician Specialty Codes  
SPC2 2nd Physician 
Specialty 
Char 3 Appendix C.1:  Physician Specialty Codes  
SPC3 3rd Physician 
Specialty 
Char 3 Appendix C.1:  Physician Specialty Codes  
SPOA1-SPOA14 Secondary Present 
on Admissions 
Char 1 Y=Yes, N=No, U=No Information, 
W=Clinically Undetermined 
1,E,(Blank)=Exempt 
 
SPROC1 1st Secondary 
Procedure  
Char 7 01 - 9999 
Refer to the ICD-9-CM Coding Manual. 
Approximately 66% 
of the records do not 
have a 1
st
 secondary 
procedure. 
SPROC1D 1st Secondary 
Procedure Date 
Num 8  Completion of this 
field is directly 
related to SPROC1. 
SPROC2 2nd Secondary 
Procedure 
Char 7 01 - 9999 
Refer to the ICD-9-CM Coding Manual. 
 
SPROC2D 2nd Secondary 
Procedure Date 
Num 8  Completion of this 
field is directly 
related to SPROC2. 
SPROC3 3rd Secondary 
Procedure 
Char 7 01 - 9999 
Refer to the ICD-9-CM Coding Manual. 
 
SPROC3D 3rd Secondary 
Procedure Date 
Num 8  Completion of this 
field is directly 
related to SPROC3. 
SPROC4 4th Secondary 
Procedure 
Char 7 01 - 9999 
Refer to the ICD-9-CM Coding Manual. 
. 
SPROC4D  4th Secondary 
Procedure Date 
Num 8  Completion of this 
field is directly 
related to SPROC4. 
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Variable Name 
(for non-ASC11) 
Data 
Element 
Type Length Values Comments 
SPROC5 5th Secondary 
Procedure  
Char 7 01 - 9999 
Refer to the ICD-9-CM Coding Manual. 
SPROC5D  5th Secondary 
Procedure Date 
Num 8 Completion of this 
field is directly 
related to SPROC5. 
SPROC6 6th Secondary 
Procedure  
Char 7 01 - 9999 
Refer to the ICD-9-CM Coding Manual. 
SPROC6D  6th Secondary 
Procedure Date 
Num 8 Completion of this 
field is directly 
related to SPROC6. 
SPROC7 7th Secondary 
Procedure  
Char 7 01 - 9999 
Refer to the ICD-9-CM Coding Manual. 
SPROC7D  7th Secondary 
Procedure Date 
Num 8 Completion of this 
field is directly 
related to SPROC7. 
SPROC8 8th Secondary 
Procedure  
Char 7 01 - 9999 
Refer to the ICD-9-CM Coding Manual. 
SPROC8D  8th Secondary 
Procedure Date 
Num 8 Completion of this 
field is directly 
related to SPROC8. 
SPROC9 9th Secondary 
Procedure  
Char 7 01 - 9999 
Refer to the ICD-9-CM Coding Manual. 
SPROC9D 9th Secondary 
Procedure Date 
Num 8 Completion of this 
field is directly 
related to SPROC9. 
SPROC10 10th Secondary 
Procedure  
Char 7 01 - 9999 
Refer to the ICD-9-CM Coding Manual. 
SPROC10D 10th Secondary 
Procedure Date 
Num 8 Completion of this 
field is directly 
related to SPROC10. 
SPROC11 11th Secondary Char 7 01 - 9999 
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Variable Name 
(for non-ASC11) 
Data 
Element 
Type Length Values Comments 
Procedure Refer to the ICD-9-CM Coding Manual. 
SPROC11D  11th Secondary 
Procedure Date 
Num 8 Completion of this 
field is directly 
related to SPROC11. 
SPROC12 12th Secondary 
Procedure  
Char 7 01 - 9999 
Refer to the ICD-9-CM Coding Manual. 
SPROC12D  12th Secondary 
Procedure Date 
Num 8 Completion of this 
field is directly 
related to SPROC12. 
TRLVL Trauma level Num 3 Appendix N – Trauma levels Completion of this 
field is directly 
related to SPROC12. 
TSTAT Teaching Status Char 1 T    Teaching Hospital 
N    Non-Teaching Hospital 
URSTAT Urban Rural 
Status 
Char 1 U     Urban 
R      Rural 
Based on MSA 
ZIP Patient Zip Code Char 9 Digits 1-5 Based on patients 
mailing address 
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Appendix C.1 – Physician Specialty Codes 
(FLAGSPC1, FLAGSPC2, FLAGSPC3) 
089 A Allergy 013 GPM General Preventive Medicine  0KK OSS Orthopedic Surgery of the Spine 
080 AD Administrative Medicine 059 GS General Surgery  033 OT Otology 
090 ADL Adolescent Medicine 015 GYN Gynecology  074 OTO Otolaryngology 
0AV ADM Addiction Medicine 016 HEM Hematology (Internal Medicine)  0AL OTR Orthopedic Trauma 
0BA ADP Addiction Psychiatry 0BT HEP Hepatology 043 P Psychiatry 
002 AI Allergy And Immunology 0WW HMP Hematology (Pathology) 041 PA 
PCC 
Clinical Pharmacology 
Pulmonary Critical Care 
0LL ALI Allergy & Immunology/Clinical 
And Laboratory Immunology 
061 HNS 
HO  
Head & Neck Surgery 
Hemotologist/Oncologist 
0AM PCH Chemical Pathology 
0XX HSO Hand Surgery (Orthopedic Surgery) 0AN PCP Cytopathology 
001 AM Aerospace Medicine 038 PD Pediatrics 
003 AN Anesthesiology 0YY HSP Surgery of the Hand (Plastic Surgery) 039 PDA Pediatric Allergy 
0MM APM Pain Management (Anesthesiology) 040 PDC Pediatric Cardiology 
056 AS Abdominal Surgery 060 HSS Surgery Of The Hand (Surgery) 0AA PDE 
PDI 
Pediatric Endocrinology 
Pediatric Infectious Disease 
085 ATP Anatomic Pathology 0BJ PDO Pediatric Otolaryncology 
000 BBK Blood Banking/Transfusion Medicine 018 ID Infectious Disease  0FF PDP Pediatric Pulmonology 
0BC CBG Clinical Biochemical Genetics 071 IG Immunology 051 PDR Pediatric Radiology 
0PP CCA Critical Care Medicine 
(Anesthesiology) 
0AB ILI Clinical And Laboratory Immunology (Internal 
Medicine) 
064 PDS Pediatric Surgery 
0BK PDT 
PE 
Medical Toxicology(Pediatrics) 
Pediatric Emergency Medicine 
0BD CCG Clinical Cytogenetics 019 IM Internal Medicine 0HH PEM Pediatric Emergency Medicine 
092 CCM Critical Care Medicine 
(Internal Medicine) 
0AC IMG Geriatric Medicine (Internal Medicine) 0AO PG Pediatric Gastroenterology 
047 PH Public Health and General Prevention Medicine 
0QQ CCP Pediatric Critical Care Medicine 0BI ISM Sports Medicine (Internal Medicine) 
0GG CCS Surgical Critical Care (Surger) 082 PHO Pediatric Hematology/Oncology 
005 CD Cardiovascular Disease 021 LM Legal Medicine  0AP PIP Immunopathology 
057 CDS Cardiovascular Surgery 087 MFM Maternal & Fetal Medicine 0AQ PLI Clinical And Laboratory 
Immunology (Pediatrics) 0CE CE Cardiac Electrophysiology 0II MG Medical Genetics 
0BE CG Clinical Genetics 098 MM 
MPD 
Medical Microbiology 
Internal Medicine/Pediatrics 
042 PM Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation 
025 CHN Child Neurology 024 N Neurology 0BL PMD Pain Medicine 
044 CHP Child & Adolescent Psychiatry 0AD NCC Critical Care Medicine (Neurological Surgery) 083 PN Pediatric Nephrology 
036 CLP Clinical Pathology 0BM PO Pediatric Ophthalmology 
0BF CMG Clinical Molecular Genetics 0DD NEO Neo-Natal 0BU PP Pediatric Pathology 
0SS CN Clinical Neurophysiology 023 NEP Nephrology 0BN PPR Pediatric Rheumatology 
058 CRS 
CTS 
Colon & Rectal Surgery 
Cardio Thoracic Surgery 
027 NM Nuclear Medicine 065 PS Plastic Surgery 
006 D Dermatology 026 NP Neuropathology 0BO PSM Sports Medicine (Pediatrics) 
0TT DDL Clinical And Laboratory 
Dermatological Immunology 
084 NPM Neonatal-Perinatal Medicine 035 PTH Anatomic/Clinical Pathology 
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099 NR Nuclear Radiology 0BP PTX Medical Toxicology (Preventive 
Medicine) 007 DIA Diabetes 062 NS Neurological Surgery 
094 DLI Diagnostic Laboratory/Immunology 0AF NSP Pediatric Surgery (Neurology) 048 PUD Pulmonary Diseases 
095 DMP Dermatopathology 028 NTR Nutrition 045 PYA Psychoanalysis 
050 DR Diagnostic Radiology 0AG OAR Adult Reconstructive Orthopedics 0JJ PYG Geriatric Psychiatry 
008 EM Emergency Medicine 049 R Radiology 
009 END Endocrinology, Diabetes And 030 OBG Obstetrics & Gynecology 088 REN Reproductive Endocrinology 
Metabolism 029 OBS Obstetrics 053 RHU Rheumatology 
0LG ESM Sports Medicine (Emergency 
Medicine) 
0AH OCC Critical Care Medicine (Obstetrics & 
Gynecology) 
0BB RIP Radioisotopic Pathology 
0BQ RNR Neuroradiology 
0BH ETX Medical Toxicology  
(Emergency Medicine) 
031 OM Occupational Medicine 0EE RO Radiation Oncology 
0AI OMO Musculoskeletal Oncology 0BR RP Radiological Physics 
037 FOP Forensic Pathology 073 ON Medical Oncology 081 SH 
SM 
SO 
Student Health 
Sleep Medicine 
Surgical Oncology 
010 FP Family Practice  0AJ OP Pediatric Orthopedics 052 TR Therapeutic Radiation 
0UU FPG Geriatric Medicine (Family Practice) 032 OPH Ophthalmology 067 TRS Traumatic Surgery 
096 FPS Facial Plastic Surgery 063 ORS Orthopedic Surgery 066 TS 
TTS 
Thoracic Surgery 
Transplant Surgery 
0VV FSM Sports Medicine (Family Practice) 069 OS Other Specialty (Physician  
designated a specialty 
other than appearing here) 
068 U Urology 
011 GE Gastroenterology 0AT UM Undersea Medicine 
014 GER Geriatrics 0BS UP Pediatric Urology 
086 GO Gynecological Oncology 0AK OSM Sports Medicine (Orthopedic Surgery) 0AU VIR Vascular And Interventional Radiology 
012 GP General Practice 0CC VS General Vascular Surgery 
OST Osteopathy USN US Navy 
USA US Army PHS US Public Health Service 
AF US Air Force 
Note:  No code appears for those physicians who have not designated a practice specialty.  The code fix appears for those physicians in a transitional year of accredited graduate medical 
education. 
An asterisk (*) preceding a Type of Practice indicates the physician is currently in a residency training program. 
An asterisk (*) following a Type of Practice indicates the physician has been certified by one of the American Board of Medical Specialties.  Current certification information should be 
obtained directly from the physician. 
The information supplied by each physician on the type of practice is interpreted from the physician’s annual re-registration application.  The Board has not verified the specific amount of 
post-graduate training in this area of practice.  The information on the type of practice is not to be used by any third party to determine specialty status.  This information should be obtained 
from the physician. 
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 Appendix C.2 – Major Diagnostic Categories 
(MDC) 
01  Diseases of the Nervous System  14  Pregnancy, Childbirth, Puerperium 
02  Diseases and Disorders of the Eye  15  Newborns, Other Neonates  
03  Ear, Nose, Mouth, and Throat  16  Blood and Blood Forming Organs 
04  Respiratory System  17  Myeloproliferative Diseases  
05  Circulatory System  18  Infectious and Paras. Diseases  
06  Diseases of the Digestive System  19  Mental Diseases and Disorders  
07  Hepatobiliary System and Pancrease 20  Alcohol/Drug Use, Induc. Organ.  
08  Musculoskeletal System  21  Injuries, Poisonings, Toxic  
09  Skin, Subcutaneous Tissue, Breast  22  Burns  
10  Endocrine, Nutritional, Metabolic  23  Factors Infl. Health Status  
11  Kidney and Urinary Tract  24  Multiple Significant Trauma  
12  Male Reproductive System  25  Human Immunodeficiency Virus  
13  Female Reproductive System  Other  Unknown Diagnosis Code  
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 Appendix C.3 – Payor 
(PAYOR) 
1 Self Pay 
2 Medicare 
3 Medicaid 
4 Commercial Ins. 
5 Worker's Compensation 
6 Indigent/Charitable Organization 
7 Other Government(Champus,State,County) 
8 HMO 
9 Not Stated 
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Appendix C.4 – Trauma Levels 
Taken from the “2005 South Carolina Health Plan” 
South Carolina Sate Health Planning Committee & SC Department of Health and Environmental Control 
Level I: 
The highest level of capability available.  Generally speaking, this hospital has to have general surgery capability in-house at all 
times.  Anesthesia capabilities are required to be in-house at all times, but this requirement may be met with CRNA’s or anesthesiology 
chief residents.  Orthopedic surgery, neurological surgery, and other surgical and medical specialties must be immediately available.  
Generally, these trauma centers will be attached to medical schools or will have residency programs because of the in-house requirements, 
since fourth year and senior trauma residents can help meet the requirements of the level I criteria.  The Level I Trauma Center also has 
the responsibility of providing education and outreach programs to other area hospitals and the public and must also conduct trauma-
related research. 
Level II: 
This trauma center has extensive capability and meets the needs of most trauma victims.  It is required to have general, neurologic, 
and orthopedic surgery available when the patient arrives.   Anesthesia capabilities are required to be in-house at all times, but this 
requirement may be met with CRNA’s.  Other surgical and medical specialties are required to be on-call and promptly available.  These 
hospitals may develop local procedures for the surgeon being available in the Emergency Department when the patient arrives.  The major 
difference between Level I and Level II facilities is that the major surgical specialties are allowed to be on-call but with the clear 
commitment to be in the Emergency Department when the patient arrives.  Level II hospitals do not have the research requirements of a 
Level I trauma Center. 
Level III: 
These Hospitals are committed to caring for the trauma patient.  Level III trauma centers can provide prompt assessment, 
resuscitation, emergency operations, and stabilization, and also arrange for possible transfer to a facility that can provide definitive trauma 
care. These hospitals are required to have general surgery, anesthesia, and internal medicine on-call and promptly available.  The general 
surgeon is required to be on-call and promptly available in the Emergency Department as the trauma team leader.   
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Appendix C.5 – Patient Discharge Status 
(DISP) 
01 Discharged to home or self care (routine discharge) 
02 Discharged/transferred to a short term general hospital for inpatient care 
03 Discharged/transferred to skilled nursing facility (SNF) w/ Medicare certification 
04 Discharged/transferred to an intermediate care facility (ICF) 
05 Discharged/transferred to a non-Medicare PPS children’s hospital or non –Medicare PPS cancer hospital for inpatient care 
06 Discharged/transferred to home under care of organized home health service organization 
07 Left against medical advice or discontinued care 
08 Discharged/transferred to home under care of a Home IV provider 
09 Admitted as an inpatient to this hospital 
10 – 19  Reserved for National Assignment 
20          Expired 
21          Effective 10/1/2009 – Dishcarged/transferred to court/law enfocement 
22 – 29  Reserved for National Assignment 
30          Still patient 
31 – 39  Reserved for National Assignment 
40          Expired at home 
41          Expired in a medical facility, e.g. hospital, SNF, ICF, or free standing Hospice 
42          Expired – place unknown 
43          Discharged/transferred to a federal health care facility 
44 – 49  Reserved for National Assignment 
50          Hospice – home 
51          Hospice – medical facility 
52 – 60  Reserved for National Assignment 
61          Discharged/transferred to hospital based Medicare approved swing bed w/in the hospital’s approved swing bed arrangement 
62          Discharge/transferred to an inpatient rehabilitation facility (IRF) including rehabilitation distinct part units of a hospital 
63          Discharged/transferred to a Medicare certified long term care hospital (LTCH) 
64          Discharged/transferred to a nursing facility certified under Medicaid but not certified under Medicare 
65          Discharged/transferred to a psychiatric hospital or psychiatric distinct part unit of a hospital 
66          Discharged/transferred to a Critical Access Hospital (CAH) 
67-69     Reserved for assignment by the NUBC 
70          Discharged/transferred to another type of health care institution not defined elsewhere in this code list (see code 05) 
71-99     Reserved for assignment by the NUBC        
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Appendix D 
Correlation Coefficients for Table 5.1 Odds Ratios and 95% Confidence Intervals for 30-Day AMI Readmissions 
Correlation Coefficients among independent variables for the Logistic Regression  
Female 
Self-
Payer 
Medicare Medicaid 
Commercial 
Insurance 
Indigent White Black 
Teaching 
Hospital 
Female 1.000 
Self-Payer -0.012 1.000 
Medicare 0.047 -0.250 1.000 
Medicaid 0.045 -0.072 -0.072 1.000 
Commercial Insurance -0.031 -0.427 -0.423 -0.122 1.000 
Indigent -0.014 -0.155 -0.154 -0.045 -0.263 1.000 
White -0.090 -0.054 -0.064 -0.047 0.090 -0.016 1.000 
Black 0.102 0.044 0.074 0.053 -0.089 0.014 -0.917 1.000
Teaching Hospital -0.004 -0.063 0.030 0.015 -0.041 0.126 -0.006 0.015 1.000 
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Appendix E 
Hospital Readmission Rate and Percentage Poor Data 
Hospital Readmission Data for the 48 Analyzed Hospitals  
Hospital ID AMI Admissions AMI Readmission Readmission Rate Percentage Poor* 
Non-Teaching 1 38 1 2.63 9.66 
Non-Teaching 2 33 2 6.06 11.15 
Non-Teaching 3 73 5 6.85 6.04 
Non-Teaching 4 58 4 6.9 13.09 
Non-Teaching 5 42 3 7.14 15.64 
Non-Teaching 6 96 7 7.29 8.07 
Non-Teaching 7 68 5 7.35 4.74 
Non-Teaching 8 63 5 7.94 5.28 
Non-Teaching 9 71 6 8.45 21.26 
Non-Teaching 10 59 5 8.47 21.51 
Non-Teaching 11 64 6 9.38 5.51 
Non-Teaching 12 62 6 9.68 8.52 
Non-Teaching 13 121 12 9.92 13.27 
Non-Teaching 14 196 21 10.71 10.55 
Non-Teaching 15 476 53 11.13 12.19 
Non-Teaching 16 71 8 11.27 20.72 
Non-Teaching 17 190 22 11.58 9.66 
Non-Teaching 18 120 14 11.67 15.84 
Non-Teaching 19 111 13 11.71 13.96 
Non-Teaching 20 129 16 12.4 7.7 
*Percentage of poor is defined as the sum of Medicaid and Indigent patients divided by total patients
at that hospital.
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Appendix E Continued 
Hospital ID AMI Admissions AMI Readmission Readmission Rate Percentage Poor* 
Non-Teaching 21 160 20 12.5 5.53 
Non-Teaching 22 135 17 12.59 10.81 
Non-Teaching 23 265 37 13.96 12.87 
Non-Teaching 24 78 11 14.1 9.49 
Non-Teaching 25 184 26 14.13 8.02 
Non-Teaching 26 40 6 15 11.94 
Non-Teaching 27 178 28 15.73 7.07 
Non-Teaching 28 211 35 16.59 9.57 
Non-Teaching 29 30 5 16.67 21.19 
Non-Teaching 30 150 25 16.67 15.99 
Non-Teaching 31 418 78 18.66 7.74 
Non-Teaching 32 528 100 18.94 10.91 
Non-Teaching 33 1476 281 19.04 6.75 
Non-Teaching 34 631 121 19.18 9.91 
Non-Teaching 35 165 32 19.39 20.02 
Non-Teaching 36 115 23 20 4.92 
Non-Teaching 37 179 38 21.23 11.31 
Non-Teaching 38 423 104 24.59 8.44 
Non-Teaching 39 290 77 26.55 7.69 
Non-Teaching 40 497 140 28.17 13.38 
*Percentage of poor is defined as the sum of Medicaid and Indigent patients divided by total patients at
that hospital.
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Appendix E Continued 
Hospital ID AMI Admissions AMI Readmission Readmission Rate Percentage Poor* 
Teaching 1 68 9 13.24 15.68 
Teaching 2 397 65 16.37 7.52 
Teaching 3 971 199 20.49 12.8 
Teaching 4 736 155 21.06 21.55 
Teaching 5 1412 323 22.88 21.42 
Teaching 6 1003 237 23.63 11.06 
Teaching 7 457 109 23.85 9.96 
Teaching 8 455 110 24.18 8.87 
*Percentage of poor is defined as the sum of Medicaid and Indigent patients divided by total patients at that
hospital.
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Appendix F 
Two Methods for Estimating Average Reference Readmission Rates And Percentage 
Poor Patients 
Comparison of Hospital Average Readmission Rate and Weighted Hospital 
Average Readmission Rate By Overall Total and Quintile 
Grouping 
Average 
Rate 
Weighted Average 
Rate* 
Percentage Poor 
Patients** 
Total 14.75% 19.03% 11.60% 
Quintile 1 12.80% 16.89% 5.63% 
Quintile 2 16.84% 20.38% 8.28% 
Quintile 3 14.58% 19.43% 10.32% 
Quintile 4 14.57% 18.29% 13.05% 
Quintile 5 14.98% 20.20% 19.52% 
*Weighted average rate weights each hospital AMI readmission rate by the
number of AMI patients admitted to each hospital relative to the overall total
or quintile total. **Percentage poor patients is the percentage of indigent and
Medicaid patients admitted for AMI relative to all AMI patients served by
hospitals in each quintile and overall total.
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Appendix G 
Bootstrapping Sample Code 
Let hi serve as placeholder for identification of each of the 48 hospitals. hi -> hn where 
n=48 
hi <- rbinom(1, (hi Sample size), (hi readmission rate)) 
theta. hi.ra<-function(hi){rbinom(1, (hi Sample size), (hi readmission rate))} 
boot. hi.ra<-bootstrap(hi, 1000, theta. hi.ra) 
CI hi <-binom.confint(boot. hi.ra$thetastar, (hi Sample size), conf.level = 0.95, 
method="exact") 
N=nrow(CI hi) 
CI hi$X<-(1:N) 
CI hi$Hosp<-" hi " 
CI hi$HID<-paste(CI hi $Hosp, CI hi $X, sep=".") 
#aggregate all boostraps 
data<-rbind(CI hi, ...., CI hn ) 
#sort by bootstrap iteration X, where X[1:1000] 
datasort<-data[order(data$X),] 
#Create 1,000 unique   to determine excess readmission rates 
pctra <- with(datasort, 
by(datasort, datasort$X, 
function(datasort) phat<-(sum(datasort$x)/sum(datasort$n)))) 
pctra 
RA<-t(sapply(pctra, I)) 
RA<-as.data.frame(RA) 
#Attach the 1,000   to each hospital for determination of excess readmission 
data1<-merge(data, RA, by="X", all.x=T) 
data1sort<-data1[order(data1$X,data1$HID),] 
#Repeat above analysis for each quintile 
datasort<-data[order(data$quintile),] 
pctra.quint <- with(datasort, 
          by(datasort, datasort$quintile, 
function(datasort) phat.quint <-(sum(datasort$x)/sum(datasort$n)))) 
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Appendix G continued 
pctra.quint 
RA.quint <-t(sapply(pctra.quint, I)) 
RA.quint <-as.data.frame(RA1.quint) 
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Appendix H 
Logistic Regression Code 
R Code for logistic Regression including age 
summary(model1<-glm(RA ~ AGE + female + PAY.SELF + PAY.CARE + PAY.CAID 
+ PAY.COMINS  + PAY.INDIGENT + WHITE +  BLACK  +  as.factor(TSTAT),
data=ami, family=binomial(logit)))
summary(model1)
exp(coef(model1))
exp(confint(model1))
R Code for logistic Regression excluding age 
summary(model2<-glm(RA ~  female + PAY.SELF + PAY.CARE + PAY.CAID + 
PAY.COMINS  
+ PAY.INDIGENT + WHITE +  BLACK  +  as.factor(TSTAT)
, data=ami, family=binomial(logit)))
summary(model2) 
exp(coef(model2)) 
exp(confint(model2)) 
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